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“Brothers and sisters of work and need 
All who are scattered and dispersed 
Come together, the flag is ready 
It flutters from anger, it is red with blood 
An oath, an oath on life and death.” 
 
 The title of this thesis comes from the stanza above, the first in the anthem “Di 
Shvue” [“The Oath”].  I deemed it an appropriate appellation for two reasons.  First, the 
actors of the pages to follow would surely have known it, and almost certainly sang it to 
begin their meetings.1  Second, and more importantly, it effectively captures the ethos of 
those agents as they engaged in the work with which this thesis is concerned. 
 The story within which my work falls is one that spans - chronologically - the 
entire Second World War and - geographically - nations across the Earth.  The story 
begins in Poland with the Nazi invasion of September 1939.  Before then, the Polish arm 
of the Algemeyner Yidisher Arbeter Bund in Lite, Poyln, un Rusland [“General Jewish 
Workers’ Union in Lithuania, Poland, and Russia,” or the “Bund,” for short,] was the 
largest Jewish political party of the Second Polish Republic.  The Bund was a socialist 
party, advocating Jewish solidarity with their Gentile fellow Socialists in pursuit of 
common revolutionary goals as well as a secular Yiddish culture.  In September 1939, 
several leaders of the Bund fled east from the invading Wehrmacht and then north from 
the invading Red Army.  Many, however, remained behind to defend the cities of Poland 
alongside their brother Socialists and see to the needs of their Jewish constituencies under 
                                                
1 “Der Yiddish-Vinkl April 22, 2005: A Weekly Briefing on the Mother Tongue,” The Jewish Daily 




occupation as best as they could.  Those who did flee went first to Vilnius, and from there 
they diverged.  Some went west, first to France and then to London.  Others went east by 
way of Japan or Shanghai to California and finally to New York City.  
 It is these refugees in New York City who have been the subject of my research.  
They did not remain idle in their safety.  Though “scattered and dispersed,” they 
proclaimed themselves to be the American Representation of the Bund in Poland 
(“Representation”) and began a campaign to raise awareness and support--both material 
and financial--for their comrades in the occupied Poland.  One vehicle for this 
undertaking was the newspaper Unzer Tsayt [Our Time], which the Representation 
established in 1941 to be its main organ.  This publication was the focus of my research 
and features most prominently of all my sources in this thesis. 
 In this thesis I defend a twofold claim.  First, I argue that the Representation 
attempted to take advantage of a preexisting tradition of solidarity between Jewish 
Socialists in New York City and in Eastern Europe, which had already manifested itself 
in the form of a flow of aid from the former to the latter.  Second, I contend that the 
Representation, while engaged in its raising of awareness and aid, simultaneously sought 
to sway readers to their cause and away from that of their Zionist contemporaries, whose 
numbers and influence had grown before the war and who remained active during it.       
 I believe this thesis starts to fill a gap that I perceive in the existing scholarship.  
By analyzing the Representation’s communication with its public, we can conclude from 
the subjects addressed and the manner in which they are presented how the 
Representation leaders understood their Yiddish public and reacted to wartime 
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developments.  This contributes to a more complete understanding of the 
Representation’s work than does merely studying the actions of its members.   
 The newspaper Unzer Tsayt is the primary source that I predominantly use in this 
thesis, but it was not the Representation’s only publication in New York City.  The group 
also published an English-language newspaper called The Ghetto Speaks, and a 1944 
essay collection called Geto in flamn [Ghetto in Flames], which chronicled events in 
occupied Poland.  I chose to focus on Unzer Tsayt because it was the Representation’s 
primary newspaper and--as a Yiddish-language newspaper--it explicitly targeted a Jewish 
audience, and is therefore the most useful source to use in evaluating the Representation’s 
interaction with the Jews of New York City.  All translations from Unzer Tsayt and other 
Yiddish sources are my own.  Where English spellings of Yiddish names were available 
in the secondary sources, I deferred to those spellings.  Where I encountered Yiddish 
names in Unzer Tsayt that were not present in the secondary literature, I transliterated 
according to the YIVO standard.2   
 My most important secondary sources in this thesis were as follows: For Our 
Freedom and Yours, by Daniel Blatman, was my main source for the flight of Bundists to 
New York City at the onset of World War II and their activities there. Tony Michels’s A 
Fire in Their Hearts: Yiddish Socialists in New York charts the genesis and growth of 
Jewish Socialism in New York City until the early 1920s, and Jonathan Frankel’s 
Prophecy and Politics: Socialism, Nationalism, and the Russian Jews, 1862-1917 
describes the early years of the Bund in Eastern Europe.  Those three sources are most 
                                                
2 YIVO Institute for Jewish Research, “Yiddish Alphabet/Alef-Beys,” What is Yiddish?, 
http://www.yivoinstitute.org/index.php?tid=57&aid=275 (accessed April 1, 2013). 
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prominently featured in the first chapter of this thesis.  For the chapter on Zionism, I 
relied on Mark Raider’s The Emergence of American Zionism.  
 This thesis is divided into three chapters.  Chapter One serves as something of a 
prologue to the argumentative components of the thesis.  It contains the necessary 
background history of the people, places, and ideologies that will pervade the thesis, and 
offers far more detail than the summary in this Introduction.  The first section of Chapter 
One is about Jewish Socialism in New York City prior to World War II, which began in 
the 1880s when Jewish revolutionaries fleeing violence in the Russian Empire arrived in 
New York City and sought to continue their campaign in the United States.  In order to 
operate among the Jews of New York City, the first Jewish Socialist leaders were forced 
to switch from their preferred Russian to the Yiddish vernacular.  Jewish Socialism 
consisted of many competing parties and movements, including the Bund-affiliated 
Jewish Socialist Federation (JSF) and Jewish mutual aid societies such as the Arbeter 
Ring [Workmen’s Circle] and the Landsmanshaftn [literally, “countrymen societies”].  
Some of these parties, such as the JSF, attempted to unite all Jewish Socialists, but were 
never successful.  However, the different parties shared common traits such as the use of 
Yiddish and a commitment to community service with projects such as educational 
efforts and cultural activities. 
 The second section of Chapter One tells of the Bund’s history in Eastern Europe.  
The Bund was founded in 1897 at a conference in present-day Vilnius, and the following 
year took part in founding the Russian Social Democratic Workers’ Party (RSDWP), 
from which the Bolsheviks later split.  In Eastern Europe, the Bund attempted to balance 
its role as a member of the internationally oriented RSDWP with its assumed role as the 
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party that represented Jewish national and cultural interests and campaigned for what it 
called Jewish “national-cultural autonomy.”  This autonomy was opposed by Vladimir 
Lenin and his circle.  During World War I, Bundists operating in different regions of the 
Russian Empire lost contact with one another, and after the war they continued to operate 
as independent entities in the newly separated states of Eastern Europe.  The Polish Bund 
became the largest Jewish party in the Second Polish Republic and also engaged in 
educational and cultural work.  This section also demonstrates the pattern of Jewish 
Socialists in the United States temporarily unifying for fundraising efforts in the face of 
turmoil among Jews in Eastern Europe. 
 The third and final section of Chapter One begins with the German invasion of 
Poland that began World War II in Europe.  Many Bundist leaders fled from Warsaw to 
Vilnius, and Bundists already in New York City coordinated and funded the emigration 
of these refugees from Vilnius to New York City.  The section concludes by detailing the 
founding of the American Representation of the Bund in Poland--which spoke on behalf 
of the Bundists who remained under occupation and began efforts to amass aid for them--
and the creation of the Representation’s newspaper Unzer Tsayt.  The Representation, I 
contend, was hoping to once again use Yiddish among the Jews of New York City in 
order to inspire their participation en masse in fundraising for beleaguered Jews overseas.  
 Chapter Two contains the arguments for my first claim, i.e., the Representation’s 
attempted insertion of itself into the tradition of transatlantic Jewish Socialist solidarity 
using Unzer Tsayt.  Drawing upon Bundist and Jewish history in Eastern Europe and in 
the United States, the Representation sought to strengthen its right to receive the aid of 
Jews in contemporary New York City in order to send that aid to the Bund in Poland.  
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The first two sections of Chapter Two focus on two of the most important Unzer Tsayt 
articles used to convince readers that the Bund, and thus the Representation, was the 
group most deserving of assistance from the Jews of New York City.  The first section is 
concerned with the article “Der Eyker fun Bundizm” [“The Principle of Bundism”], 
which is actually a reprint of a 1934 speech given by Bundist leader Henryk Erlich.  In 
this article, “Erlich” explains that the Polish Bund is the only party in Eastern Europe that 
can legitimately claim to be the heir of the original Bund, which was the greatest 
champion of Jewish interests in the future Marxist world utopia because it fused 
Socialism with a Yiddish culture.  The article identifies both Poland and the United States 
as countries wherein Jewish Socialists undertook this dual agenda.  The article with 
which the second section of Chapter Two is concerned, “Bund un Bundizm” [“Bund and 
Bundism”], further advances the Bund’s claim to the good will of American Jewry by 
arguing that Jewish Socialism anywhere, including New York City, is merely Bundism 
adapted to that environment.  Taken together, these two articles encapsulate the 
Representation’s bid for the hearts and minds of the Jews of New York City: the articles 
describe the Bund’s positive role in the history of Jews in Eastern Europe and in New 
York City in order to demonstrate its present right to receive aid in return from readers of 
Unzer Tsayt.  The third and final section of Chapter Two describes how the 
Representation not only reported on the Holocaust in Unzer Tsayt and Geto in flamn, but 
inserted the Bund into those reports in the role of representative and benefactor of the 
Polish Jews, better able to help those Polish Jews (and thus better deserving of support 
from American Jews) than the Allied governments.    
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 Chapter Three contains the arguments for my second claim, concerning the 
Representation’s need to address their ascendant Zionist rivals.  The first section is a 
condensed history of Zionism’s growth in popularity and influence within the United 
States.  The second section describes the attacks against Zionism that the Representation 
leveled in Unzer Tsayt, which I divide into theoretical and practical criticisms.  The 
theoretical grievances of the Representation against Zionism included Zionism’s 
advocacy of Hebrew over Yiddish, its perceived dismissal of Yiddish and Diaspora 
culture as a whole, and the blow that Jews’ status as citizens in the Diaspora would suffer 
if a Jewish State were created in Palestine.  The practical issues that the Representation 
identified in the Zionist enterprise was the inability of Palestine to house all the world’s 
Jews and the continued reliance that a Jewish State would inevitably have on the 
Diaspora for economic support.  Identifying these undesirable Zionist traits allowed the 
Representation to better define Bundism as the ideology that respected Yiddish language 
and culture and would build a wonderful Socialist world for the Jews in the lands where 
they already lived, a world in which they would peacefully coexist with their Gentile 
fellow Socialists.   
 In its newspaper Unzer Tsayt, the American Representation of the Bund in Poland 
blended reports on news from around the world with ideological polemics lauding 
Bundism and decrying opponents of Bundism such as Communists and Zionists.  Unzer 
Tsayt was a medium wherein the Representation sought not only to raise funds to send 
back to Poland, but in the process win over readers to the Bundist way of thinking.  It 
combined the urgent needs of the present with a long running ideological battle from the 
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past and the vision of a Bundist future.  It is precisely that complexity that drove the 















 The first article in the first issue of Unzer Tsayt (February 1941) was entitled 
simply “Tsu di Lezer!” [“To the Readers!”].  The article describes a hellish Nazi 
occupation, where “[t]he Jewish working masses of Eastern Europe, who have fought for 
three generations under the glorious flag of the Bund for a better life, for their human and 
national dignity and for a world of freedom and equality, fight now for their mere 
physical existence.”  It concludes by appealing to the “[t]housands of Jewish workers, 
who in the old home stood in the ranks of the ‘Bund’” and who are now dispersed 
throughout the Americas.1  This article hints at a much larger history of Jewish Socialist 
work in Eastern Europe and in the United States, with which a reader of this thesis must 
become familiar before engaging with the arguments of the second and third chapters.  
That history, presented in this chapter, consists primarily of two great narratives.  The 
first section of this chapter will be a much-abridged history of Jewish Socialism in New 
York City beginning in the 1880s, and the second will be a likewise condensed account 
of the Bund in Eastern Europe from its genesis in 1897.  Both of these narratives will end 
in 1939, the year Germany invaded Poland to open World War II’s European theater.  
The third and final section of this chapter will chronicle the meeting of the Eastern 
Europe and New York City histories, beginning with the German invasion, continuing 
with the flight of Bundist leaders to New York City, and concluding with the founding of 
the American Representation of the Bund in Poland and of the newspaper Unzer Tsayt.  
Reading this chapter, a reader will become familiarized with the two worlds that the 
                                                
1 “Tsu di Lezer,” Unzer Tsayt, February 1941, 2. 
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Representation sought to bridge: the struggle for the rights of Jewish labor in Eastern 
Europe and the altogether different realm of American Jewish Socialism into which the 
Representation entered.  The second and third chapters, in a sense, chronicle the 
Representation’s attempt in Unzer Tsayt to forge a unity out of this evident disparity.  
Another article in the first issue of Unzer Tsayt implored readers not to forget that the 
fates of Jews the world over were connected, and that the only party whose fate was 
“completely tied” with the fate of Jews in the Diaspora was the Bund.2 
 
Jewish Socialists in New York City, 1882-1939 
 The history of Jewish Socialism in Eastern Europe (dominated in the late 19th 
century by the Russian Empire) begins in New York City.  As Jonathan Frankel 
demonstrates in his book Prophecy and Politics: Socialism, Nationalism, and the Russian 
Jews, 1862-1917, the success of Jewish Socialist movements in New York City would 
inspire the creation of similar movements in the Russian Empire.  However, the most 
authoritative scholarship of Jewish Socialism in New York City is Tony Michels’s 2005 
book A Fire in Their Hearts: Yiddish Socialists in New York.  Michels’s book will serve 
as the principal source for this chapter’s treatment of Jewish Socialism in New York City.   
 The men and women who would found the first Jewish Socialist organization in 
New York City began to arrive in the city in 1882.  In 1881, after the assassination of 
Czar Alexander II, agitators claimed that Jews were behind the killing and that the new 
czar, Alexander III, had sanctioned retribution.3  The wave of pogroms that followed and 
                                                
2 A. Menes,“Di Natsyonale Shlikhes fun Bund,” Unzer Tsayt, February 1941, 6, 9. 
3 Encyclopedia Judaica (online edition, through the Gale Virtual Reference Library), s.v. “Pogroms,” by 
Hehudah Slutsky, accessed January 14, 2013, 
http://go.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CCX2587515895&v=2.1&u 
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the oppressive anti-Jewish May Laws passed by Alexander III in 1882 prompted mass 
emigration.  One group of immigrants lived in an insular Lower East Side community 
that was nicknamed the “Russian Colony.”  Michels offers a compelling psychological 
profile of these newcomers.  In their youth, as students in the Russian Empire, they had 
been constantly exposed to Russian radicalism.  “Many of them,” Michels writes, “had 
believed that education and revolution would lead to a better future for themselves and 
the Russian people.”  However, the anti-Jewish hysteria in Russia after Alexander II’s 
assassination shattered this illusion with the realization that they were not a part of the 
narod (the Russian nation).  For the first time, the disenchanted revolutionaries sought 
out the masses of Russian Jews who lived without secular education or revolutionary 
ideals, viewing them now as a people in danger and hoping to rally them and find a 
solution to the glaring peril before them.  For many communities, that solution was 
emigration to the United States.4 
 In New York City, the denizens of the Russian Colony found that their status as 
enlightened and educated Russian radicals meant little in the scramble for work and 
survival.  With a poor grasp of English, they were compelled to find work in workshops 
and factories alongside other Jews of New York City.  Once again, albeit unwillingly, the 
Russian-Jewish intellectuals were mingling with the people.  Again, Michels offers a 
glimpse at their inner anguish.  Gilded Age New York City had nothing in common with 
imperial Russia.  While it offered respite from pogroms, it seemed to the Russian 
Colonists that the city lacked an intellectual or revolutionary culture.  New Yorkers, it 
                                                                                                                                            
umuser&it=r&p=GVRL&sw=w. 
4 Tony Michels, A Fire in Their Hearts: Yiddish Socialists in New York (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2005), 27, 32. 
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seemed, were materialistic and “‘soulless’” in their pursuit of profit.5  Feeling isolated 
and nostalgic, the Colonists began mingling with another Lower East Side community 
called Kleindeutschland [Little Germany].  Little Germany was home to a thriving 
Socialist movement that harkened to the Marxism of Germany itself, a movement that the 
Russian-Jewish radicals had long admired.  Furthermore, it was no great challenge for 
those with some command of Yiddish to learn the German language.  The Colonists went 
to German Socialist meetings and read their publications.  By the early 1890s, Yiddish-
speaking Jews had become the “‘principal constituency’” of one local Socialist leader in 
Little Germany.6  Several years of fraternization with the German socialists of the Lower 
East Side inspired a few of the Russian-Jewish revolutionaries to create Socialist groups 
and publications in order to bring their legacy of Russian radicalism to their own 
constituency, the Jews of New York City.  They decided that this would be best 
accomplished by using the Yiddish language rather than their preferred Russian.   
 Jewish Socialism in New York City was not a monolithic movement.  As it 
expanded beginning in the 1890s, it became an ideology that encompassed a multitude of 
parties, newspapers, and figures.  The first Yiddish-speaking Socialist group was the 
Yidisher Arbeter Fareyn [Jewish Workers’ Association, or JWA], which activists in the 
Russian Colony founded in 1885.  The organization broke ground in several ventures that 
later Jewish Socialists would also undertake.  Despite their unfamiliarity with the inner 
workings of labor life, intellectual leaders of the JWA organized 14 Jewish labor unions, 
including typographers, bakers, garment makers, and peddlers, and led them in efforts of 
collective bargaining.  Perhaps more befitting of their lofty background, JWA leaders 
                                                
5 Tony Michels, A Fire in Their Hearts: Yiddish Socialists in New York (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2005), 36-37, 39. 
6 Ibid., 41-42, 46, 52. 
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also sponsored lectures and founded the first two Socialist Yiddish newspapers (though 
the first folded after four issues because of printing costs).  Despite these early successes, 
the JWA’s clout diminished following the Great Upheaval of 1886, a widespread but 
ultimately unsuccessful series of strikes in New York City among many professions.  All 
14 of the JWA-created unions disbanded, the group’s newspaper ceased publication, and 
the JWA itself disbanded in 1887.7  More lasting entities that emerged in the following 
years included United Hebrew Trades and the Yiddish daily newspaper Forverts 
[Forward].8  The myriad Jewish Socialist groups that emerged in New York City prior to 
the First World War shared traits such as embrace of Socialism in some form, use of the 
Yiddish language, and educational efforts such as newspapers, journals, and lecturers.  
Points of contention between the different groups included stances on Zionism and the 
insistence by some groups that strict Marxism was the only legitimate Socialism.    
 In A Fire in Their Hearts, Tony Michels also recounts the genesis of the Bundist 
movement in particular in America.  Thousands of Bundists immigrated to the United 
States at the turn of the 20th century--particularly after the Revolution of 1905--and for 
the next decade and a half, they carried out a campaign almost identical to that of their 
comrades in the Russian Empire, championing Jewish Socialist autonomy within a 
broader Socialist movement and some incarnation of secular Jewish cultural identity.  
They achieved the former aim through the proxy of the Jewish Socialist Agitation 
Bureau, whose leaders were Bundists almost to a man.  In 1912, “the [American] 
Socialist Party began allowing foreign-language federations to join the party as 
autonomous subsections.”  The Agitation Bureau--renamed the Jewish Socialist 
                                                
7 Tony Michels, A Fire in Their Hearts: Yiddish Socialists in New York (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2005), 27, 48-49, 52-54, 60. 
8 Ibid., 61. 
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Federation (JSF)--functioned as the American Bundist movement and enrolled as the 
Jewish subsection of the Socialist Party.9  However, the Bund, the Agitation Bureau, and 
the JSF were unsuccessful in advancing their cultural agenda.  To begin with, they never 
produced a concrete definition of their proposed yidishe kultur [Yiddish culture], a 
“national” program that they contrasted with “nationalism.”  Opponents failed to make 
the same distinction, reminded advocates that elements of yidishe kultur (such as Yiddish 
newspapers and literature) were already present, and pointed out that in America, unlike 
in Russia, no Jewish cultural program was really necessary because Jews were not 
constrained as they were in Russia.  Furthermore, they concluded, the program was 
incompatible with orthodox Marxism.10 
 Historians Jonathan Frankel and Yaacov Goldstein cite two historical events from 
the year 1917 as catalysts for great upheaval in the Jewish Socialist ranks worldwide: the 
Bolshevik revolution and the Balfour Declaration, in which British Foreign Secretary 
Arthur Balfour announced the support of the British government for a “national home for 
the Jewish people” in Palestine.  The Bolshevik revolution brought Communism much 
greater attention from the world, Jews included, and the Balfour Declaration 
accomplished the same for Zionism.  Suddenly the Jewish masses worldwide, including 
in New York City, were confronted with options that appeared equally viable to 
Bundism.  Frankel claims that the division was most apparent in the United States, as 
evidenced by the eventual schism of the Jewish Socialist Federation.  In 1921, the JSF 
voted to break from the American Socialist Party and embraced Communism; in 1922 it 
was absorbed by the United States’ nascent Communist Party.  Members of the JSF who 
                                                
9 Tony Michels, A Fire in Their Hearts: Yiddish Socialists in New York (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2005), 172-173. 
10 Ibid., 168-170. 
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opposed the decision because of their avowed Bundist loyalty to orthodox Marxism 
simply left.  The largest faction to break away from the JSF was the Jewish Socialist 
Farband, which most closely resembled the Bund in ideology and action and acted to 
prevent the spread of Communism among Jews.11  Smaller elements of the former JSF, 
also anti-Communist, aligned themselves with labor Zionism.12  With the JSF effectively 
gone, much of its work fell to Jewish labor aid organizations such as the landsmanshaftn 
[literally, “countryman societies”] and the Arbeter Ring [Workman’s Circle], an 
American Jewish fraternal order of workers whose primary aim was to provide its 
members with health benefits, financial assistance, and death services. 
 The existence of landsmanshaftn in the United States long predated the 
immigration of Russian Jewish Socialists at the turn of the century, while the Arbeter 
Ring was founded roughly contemporaneously with that influx (1892).  The relationship 
between the Bund and these groups was complex; Bundists arriving in New York City 
after the 1905 revolution integrated themselves into the preexisting Jewish labor 
movement there, founding or joining landsmanshaftn and chapters of the Arbeter Ring.  
However, while they valued the efforts of these groups and sought to assist them, 
Bundists also regarded the presence of “innumerable organizations” as symptomatic of 
                                                
11 The Jewish Socialist Farband published its own newspaper and continued to oppose the influence of 
Communism and Zionism among American Jewish workers throughout the 1920s and 1930s, though its 
membership aged and declined.  It was a member of the Jewish Labor Committee and worked to prevent 
any funds being used for Zionist causes.   
Jonathan Frankel, “The Bundists in America and the ‘Zionist Problem,’” in Crisis, Revolution, and Russian 
Jews, by Jonathan Frankel, ed. Edith Frankel (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 232.  
12 Jonathan Frankel, Prophecy and Politics: Socialism, Nationalism, and the Russian Jews, 1862-1917 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 559-560; Yaavoc Goldstein, Jewish Socialists in the 
United States: The Cahan Debate 1925-1926 (Brighton, England: Sussex Academic Press, 1998), 4-5; 
Encyclopedia Judaica (online edition through Gale Virtual Reference Library), s.v. “Jewish Socialist 
Verband,” by Charles Bezalel Sherman, accessed October 25, 2012, 
http://go.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CCX2587510150&v=2.1&u=umuser&it
=r&p=GVRL&sw=w; Frankel, Crisis, Revolution, and Russian Jews, 232. 
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American Jewish labor’s lack of a “single satisfactory Jewish Socialist structure.”13  
Entities like the Jewish Socialist Agitation Bureau and the Jewish Socialist Federation 
were meant to provide this single structure, but they never succeeded in uniting all wings 
of Jewish labor.    
 Despite the lamentations of the Bund at their supposedly disparate existence and 
operation, groups like the landsmanshaftn and Arbeter Ring engaged in the same sort of 
work as the Bund with remarkable results.  Since these two groups were, at their most 
basic level, mutual aid societies, they engaged from their onset in projects like education, 
founding and running networks of Yiddish language schools in New York City and 
throughout the United States (many of which still exist today).  One Arbeter Ring activist, 
Yankev Levin, wrote an article in October 1918 describing a burgeoning culture that was 
“purely secular” but “thoroughly Jewish.”  This included Yiddish mutual aid societies, 
literary circles, and chess clubs, and was comparable to the notion of yidishe kultur that 
the Bund and its allies had advocated.14  However, when these societies truly shone is in 
the years following the effective end of the JSF in 1921.  During the 1920s and 1930s, the 
landsmanshaftn in particular donated disproportionately large sums of money to the 
American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, which sought to provide succor to East 
European Jewry following the hardships of World War I.  As the years and then the 
decades passed, the landsmanshaftn flagged in their fundraising efforts not for lack of 
                                                
13 Tony Michels, A Fire in Their Hearts: Yiddish Socialists in New York (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2005), 156, 167, 180. 
14 Ibid., 179. 
17  
zeal, but because of declining membership and chapter count and competition from 
Zionist groups.15  
 This, then, was the state of Jewish Socialism in New York City on the eve of 
World War II.  It was fractured and tumultuous, with disagreeing parties, newspapers, 
and leaders coming and going.  However, Jewish Socialists shared commonalities such as 
use of the Yiddish language to reach their constituency and projects at building a secular 
Jewish community through education and culture.  The aid efforts of societies such as the 
landsmanshaftn or Arbeter Ring embraced a broad population.  As the next section will 
detail, Jewish labor in New York City also played a crucial role in the birth, growth, and 
survival of brother movements in Eastern Europe, most importantly the Bund.  
 
The Bund in Eastern Europe, 1897-1939 
 Jewish Socialists in Eastern Europe were aware of the success of their New York 
peers from very early on.  Jonathan Frankel reports that “newspapers journals, and 
pamphlets in Yiddish filtered into Russia” from New York City and London “from at 
least 1888.”  By 1896, workers in Warsaw were reading “‘the entire American Yiddish 
socialist [sic] literature,’” and even non-Jewish Socialists such as Józef Piłsudski 
imported such texts.  The success of Socialists in New York City who used Yiddish as 
the language of their press and trade unions “proved that a Yiddish-speaking labor 
movement could succeed” and inspired attempts in Eastern Europe to copy the feat.  One 
notable instance of this took place in Vilnius, where a young group of Jewish Socialists 
known simply as the “Vilna movement” were based.  In 1893 the Vilna movement 
                                                
15 Michael R. Weisser, A Brotherhood of Memory: Jewish Landsmanshaftn in the New World (New York: 
Basic Books, Inc., 1985), 119, 191. 
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adopted a so-called “‘new program,’” officially switching from the use of Russian to 
Yiddish.  However, the Vilna movement did not adopt the internationalist ideology of 
Socialists in New York City, being concerned only with the plight of Jews in the Russian 
Empire, who were subject to discrimination in work, education, and residence.16  
 Leaders of the Vilna movement were instrumental in the formation of the Bund.  
In 1897 they called a congress in Vilnius of thirteen delegates, six of whom were from 
Vilnius and most of whom had at some point been members of the Vilna movement.  
After some debate, the party named itself the General Jewish Workers’ Union in Russia 
and Poland, and later amended this to the General Jewish Workers’ Union in Lithuania, 
Russia, and Poland.  The delegates intended for this name to represent the unity among 
Jewish workers throughout the western Russian Empire, but among those workers it was 
known simply as the Bund.17  Throughout the Bund’s existence it would be plagued and 
torn by the conundrum that its obviously Jewish origin and constituency presented: was it 
a movement in line with the international doctrine of Marxism or the national needs and 
character of Russian Jewry?  The Bund never definitively resolved this question.  
Factions advocating each answer bickered ceaselessly, and the Bund’s congresses also 
testified to this tension: the Third Congress (December 1899) adopted a resolution stating 
“‘the Bund [demands] only civil - not national - rights,’” but less than two years later the 
Fourth Congress (April 1901) committed the party to Jewish national autonomy.  Frankel 
points out that such quarrels over internationalism and nationalism took place within 
other parties at this time: the Polish movement split into the Polish Socialist Party and 
Polish Social Democrats, the Russian Social Democratic Workers’ Party split into 
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Mensheviks and Bolsheviks, and the Zionist Poalei Zion [Workers of Zion] split into 
three parties.18  In the Bund’s dealings with other groups, it nonetheless managed to 
present a fairly unified front advocating its national autonomy within the international 
Socialist movement.      
 The Russian Social Democratic Workers’ Party (RSDWP), which was the chief 
Socialist party in Russia until its fracture into Mensheviks and Bolsheviks, began its first 
congress on March 1, 1898, mere months after the Bund’s formation.  The RSDWP was 
the outcome of a joint effort of the Bund and other Socialist groups.  The First Congress 
passed a provisional constitution that contained a special clause concerning the Bund: 
“‘The [Bund] enters the party as an autonomous organization, independent only in 
questions which specifically concern the Jewish proletariat.’”  In other words, the Bund 
had achieved its goal of national autonomy within an international party.  However, this 
triumph was very short-lived.  Vladimir Lenin, who had initially praised the Bund for its 
role in creating the Russian labor movement, now began his bid for control over the 
RSDWP in order to bring all of its elements in line with what he considered orthodox 
Marxism.  Frankel identifies Lenin’s launch of the newspaper Iskra on December 1, 1900 
as the onset of this campaign.  The newspaper only attacked the Bund’s alleged 
separatism once, generally maintaining calculated silence.  Nonetheless, Lenin planned a 
confrontation with the Bund for the RSDWP’s upcoming Second Congress.19  
 The Bund’s Fifth Congress convened in June 1903 and set about crafting a 
platform for the upcoming Second Congress of the RSDWP.  As ever, delegates were 
divided on nationalism or the Iskra-advocated internationalism.  Ultimately, though, they 
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pieced together a program demanding that the RSDWP recognize the Bund as “‘the 
Social Democratic organization of the Jewish proletariat…[and] its sole representative [in 
the RSDWP].’”  The Second Congress of the RSDWP convened in July 1903, and the 
issue of the Bund was the first one of importance on the agenda.  By now Lenin’s faction 
had an unbeatable majority among the delegates.  The autonomy of the Bund guaranteed 
at the First Congress was revoked and the new Bundist proposals were resoundingly 
defeated.  Bundist delegates withdrew from the Congress and, by extension, from the 
RSDWP.  Two years later, the Bund’s Sixth Congress (October 1905) included 
“‘national-cultural autonomy’” in its program, which meant that the Bund, not the larger 
party, would have authority over the “free cultural development” of the Jewish workers.  
The following year, the Fourth Congress of the RSDWP (April 1906) approved the 
readmission of the Bund into the party and agreed to its condition of national-cultural 
autonomy (the Bund’s Seventh Congress ratified reunification that August).20   
 Jonathan Frankel writes that Lenin supported the Bund’s readmission because he 
had abandoned hopes of streamlining the party and judged from the Bund’s conduct since 
its departure from the RSDWP that it was more or less in line with his Bolshevist aims.  
However, the Bund’s victory was incomplete, as it had not repeated its claim to sole 
representation of the Jewish proletariat, nor even included it in its platform for the 
RSDWP congress.  In order to be readmitted into the RSDWP’s ranks, the Bund had 
abandoned the tenets that had caused controversy and received only the minor concession 
of national-cultural autonomy.  However, Frankel explains that the Bund was willing to 
accept this outcome because it realized that regardless of theoretical or ideological 
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decisions handed down by lofty party leaders, it would, in practicality, retain its 
supremacy among Jews on the “‘street’” and continue to be their de facto sole 
representation.21 
 Accompanying the Bund’s hegemony on the Jewish street was dominance in the 
realm of finances.  From its onset, the Bund was “increasingly financed from without” 
(primarily from supporters in the United States), which gave it a great measure of control 
over its affiliate groups.  Frankel points out that a deterrent for any Bundists or Bundist 
factions harboring thoughts of breaking from the party was the realization that much of 
their financial resources would be cut off.  Breakaway groups could not count on the 
same “enormous reserves of good will on the Lower East Side” that the Bund could.  
Frankel describes several noteworthy examples of aid sent from New York City to 
Eastern Europe in the early 1900s.  After the horrific Kishinev pogrom of 1903, the New 
York City newspaper Forverts established its own relief fund for the victims.  It raised 
and forwarded some $8,000, but was unable to win over all Jewish Socialist factions in 
the city, who made their own (sometimes larger) contributions.  More successful were the 
later efforts of the American Committee for the Relief of Russian Jews.  The Committee 
was established at a joint meeting of representatives from “all the major sections of New 
York Jewry” on November 7, 1905, several months after the failed Russian revolution.  
The Committee raised roughly four million dollars worldwide (its original goal was one 
million dollars), with over half a million dollars coming from New York City.  The 
outbreak of World War I and reports of Jewish hardship on the Eastern Front catalyzed 
more fundraising.  In this campaign, collection was handled by many local organizations, 
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but all the funds were sent overseas by the newly established Joint Distribution 
Committee.22 
 Like Tony Michels, writing years later, Jonathan Frankel concludes that 
movements for the political unity of American Jewish Socialists in the early 1900s were 
unsuccessful.  However, his accounts of fundraising in the same period reveal a trend: 
when news of trouble in Eastern Europe reached the Jews of New York City and the 
United States, the nearest thing to unity among Jewish Socialist ranks was achieved, and 
the effectiveness of these efforts improved with time.  Furthermore, these efforts inspired 
attempts at political unity.  After the American Committee for the Relief of Russian Jews 
had concluded its 1905 campaign, “two separate attempts were made to establish 
unity…in [the sphere] of politics.”23  Although concerted fundraising among New York 
City Jews flagged in the 1920s and 1930s,24 the framework to do so remained in place 
thanks to the establishment of the Joint Distribution Committee, which along with the 
Jewish Labor Committee would be called upon again to handle large amounts of aid 
during the Second World War. 
 By 1905, the Bund had become the dominant Socialist movement in the Pale of 
Settlement, home to most Russian Jews.  In the years before World War I it weathered 
competition with rival Jewish Socialist groups (which collapsed by 1906) and with 
Zionist groups active among Russian Jews.  (The Bund’s rivalry with Zionism is covered 
in greater detail in Chapter Three.)  The First World War and the Russian Revolution, 
however, proved to be traumatic events for the Bund.  When the Pale of Settlement fell 
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into German hands, Bundist leaders sensed that the war would result in an independent 
Poland, and in December 1917 they convened the inaugural congress of the Polish Bund 
in Lublin.  Bundists within the Russian Empire participated actively in the February 
Revolution, but members were slowly becoming divided along Menshevik and Bolshevik 
lines.  After the November Revolution the issue was settled for them: Bolshevik-leaning 
Bundists joined the Jewish section of the Communist Party by 1921, and any rump 
groups outside Lenin’s fold were suppressed by 1928.  The Bund had ceased to exist in 
Russia.25  Decades later, the Representation wrote in Unzer Tsayt that because the Soviet 
Union, a state with avowed international interests, had not tolerated any groups with 
national (in this case, Jewish) loyalties, there was now no one to speak on behalf of the 
Soviet Jews when they were in desperate need of aid from the government.26 
 The Bund was active in newly independent Romania and Latvia.  However, its 
locus remained in the Second Polish Republic, whose borders encompassed such old 
Bundist territories as Lithuania and the Pale of Settlement.  Here, its activities were 
varied and sweeping.  As a legal political party, Bundist candidates stood in Polish local 
and national elections.  Its showings in the Polish Sejm were considerably worse than in 
local elections because of its refusal to cooperate with larger Polish parties such as the 
Polish Socialist Party.27  In international politics, the Bund opted not to joint the 
Comintern, instead joining the Labor and Socialist International in 1930.  In this group, it 
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was recognized as the official representative of Polish Jewish workers.  Among its 
constituency, the Bund activated the ideology of dokayt [“here-ness”], claiming that Jews 
were better off in the lands where they were than in Palestine.  In service to Polish Jews, 
the Bund published several newspapers to communicate political, educational, and 
cultural topics.  It was also the largest political party to support Poland’s Central Yiddish 
School Organization, whose schools offered a secular education in Yiddish.  
Additionally, its youth movements ran social outdoor activities to give Jewish children 
and teenagers a sense of community and training as leaders.  By the mid-1930s, writes 
Daniel Blatman, the Bund had become “the dominant Jewish organization in the 
country,” and saw itself as the “champion of the national and social aspirations of the 
Jewish masses.”28  All that the party did in the realms of politics, press, education, and 
youth activities, it did under the banner of dokayt and in the service of a Jewish 
population that it expected would remain in Poland.  The services that the Polish Bund 
rendered to Polish Jews later provided Bundists in World War II-era New York City with 
grounds to seek help from Jews there for Bundists still in Poland. 
  
The Flight to New York City and the Birth of Unzer Tsayt, 1939-1941 
 German forces invaded Poland by land and air on September 1, 1939.  The Polish 
Sejm held its last session on September 2, and on September 5 representatives of the 
Polish government gave a press conference and announced the government’s intention to 
flee east from Warsaw.  That night, Bundist leaders held the first of several meetings 
during the days of September 5-6 debating what course of action to take.  Pinchas 
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Schwartz--a journalist for the Bund’s Yiddish newspaper Folkstsaytung [People’s 
Newspaper]--who had attended the government’s press conference, informed the group 
that the Polish government had several seats on their evacuation train reserved for Jewish 
leaders.  Most of the assembly believed that the Bundist leaders should also flee eastward 
and continue the party’s work there.  A minority argued that the leaders ought to remain 
with the rank-and-file Bundists who were preparing to defend Warsaw along the Polish 
workers.  Ultimately, the Bund’s Central Committee decided to flee the capital and its 
lower-ranking leaders elected to remain in Warsaw.29 
 Members of the Central Committee of the Bund fled in different directions to 
different cities with different specific aims.  This study does not detail all their fates.  
Those interested in the Bund’s fate in occupied Poland should consult Daniel Blatman’s 
book For Our Freedom and Yours.  By late October 1939 much of the Central 
Committee had gathered in Wilno (Vilnius).  The Red Army had captured Wilno during 
its invasion of eastern Poland, and then turned control over to the Lithuanians.  This was 
fortunate for the Central Committee, as the Red Army had been rounding up and 
arresting Bundist leaders.  Under Lithuanian rule, Wilno served as a safe haven for them.  
At the end of 1939, Jewish leaders in New York City and London began efforts to extract 
Central Committee members from Wilno.  The Bundist leaders delayed leaving for 
several months, instead using the money supplied to them by organizations such as the 
Joint Distribution Committee to set up institutions for the 16,000 Jewish refugees who 
had also arrived in Lithuania.  But in June 1940 the Red Army reentered Lithuania, which 
entered the Soviet Union that August.  A wide assembly of individuals and organizations 
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operating out of multiple countries worked over the next year to get the Central 
Committee and others out of Lithuania by a combination of covert escape operations 
(such as the one that moved Bundist leader Shloime Mendelsohn to Stockholm), 
procuring of special visas, and simple overland travel out of the Soviet Union.  In late 
1939, 400 members of the Bund (including members of the Central Committee) had 
gathered in Wilno.  By November 1941, 200 had reached the United States and Canada, 
mostly by going through the Soviet Union and Japan, and another 46 had taken up 
residence in Shanghai.  Those who eventually reached New York City included almost all 
members of the Central Committee and a cadre of veteran cultural activists and 
journalists.30     
 One instrumental group in the rescue of Bundists from Eastern Europe was a 
group of three Bundists who had arrived in New York city a year before the beginning of 
World War II: Emanuel Nowogrodzki (secretary of the Central Committee), Jacob Pat, 
and Benjamin Tabaczynski.  Until the war, they had engaged in fundraising.  Once the 
war broke out, Pat and Tabaczynski joined the Jewish Labor Committee (JLC), and Pat 
became its secretary-general.  The JLC had been established in 1934 as an umbrella 
organization of Jewish labor groups to coordinate a response to the Nazi threat.31  During 
World War II the JLC, led by president Adolph Held, played the lead role in securing 
money and visas for Bundists still in Eastern Europe.  Additionally, both the JLC and 
Nowogrodzki working independently sent money and food to the general Jewish refugee 
population in Lithuania and occupied Poland.  In Novemeber 1939, the three Bundists 
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and eight colleagues founded the American Representation of the Bund in Poland and 
proclaimed that its purpose was organizing relief operations and fundraising.  Initially, 
some tensions existed between the Representation and the Central Committee in Wilno 
regarding spheres of authority, but the arrival of Central Committee members in New 
York City in late 1941 settled the issue.  The Central Committee continued to direct 
matters of ideology among the Bundist exiles, while the Representation’s authority over 
more practical matters such as organization, politics, and fundraising was formalized.  
The Presidium of the Representation included Nowgrodzki, Shloime Mendelsohn, and 
Szmuel Zygielbojm, who had arrived in the United States via France in 1940 and who 
served for much of the war as the group’s semi-official diplomat in London.32  As late as 
1944, opponents of the Representation questioned its right to speak on behalf on anyone, 
and the Representation defended its claim to speak for the Bund in its newspaper by 
citing dispatches from the underground Bund in Poland.33 
 For the first two years of the war, until the arrival of Central Committee members 
in 1941, the Representation raised small sums of money themselves to send Poland and 
Lithuania.  These funds were mostly donated by a small group of relatives, friends, and 
sympathizers of the Representation, and never exceeded a few thousand dollars.  They 
reached their intended recipients through various channels, passing through such cities as 
Zurich, Stockholm, Copenhagen, and Tangiers.  The JLC was not yet prepared for the 
gathering and transfer of relief on a large scale.  After the Central Committee’s arrival, 
however the Representation’s role changed drastically.  The Polish-Soviet accord in the 
summer of 1941 now made it possible for the JLC to forward larger sums ($100,000 over 
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the next year and a half) to Nazi-occupied lands through the Soviet Union.  The 
Representation’s influence over the JLC had grown: in early 1942 the JLC assumed 
responsibility for raising relief money and forwarding it according to lists that the 
Representation prepared.  At the same time, the Representation ceased its own 
fundraising efforts, redirecting the $30,000 it had already accumulated that year to 
“information and propaganda activities” such as its party newspaper, Unzer Tsayt [Our 
Time].34       
 Unzer Tsayt, the central organ of the Representation, was a monthly Yiddish 
newspaper that released its first issue in February 1941.35  Its writers included some of 
the most prominent Representation leaders, such as Nowogrodzki, Pat, and Mendelsohn.  
To describe it as a “newspaper” is only partially accurate.  It is certainly true that Unzer 
Tsayt reported on events of Jewish interest in the United States, Great Britain, Palestine, 
Poland, the Soviet Union, and other countries.  But the Representation also used Unzer 
Tsayt as a platform from which to broadcast its ideology in the form of articles about 
topics such as Bundist history or the activities of its rivals.  As the party’s central organ, 
Unzer Tsayt was surely intended to play an important role in the Representation’s 
propaganda campaign on behalf of the JLC’s fundraising efforts.  I defend this claim in 
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 As recounted in Chapter One, there was interaction in the first half of the 20th 
century between the Jewish Socialists of New York City and those of Eastern Europe.  
American Jews sent aid to Eastern Europe with some regularity, particularly when Jews 
there suffered hardship.  It would therefore not have been difficult for the American 
Representation of the Bund in Poland to convince the Jews of New York City during the 
1940s to continue participating in this tradition by sending money and other aid to 
Eastern Europe.  The true task before the Representation was to instill in them the belief 
that the Polish Bund alone should receive such aid.  They undertook this campaign in two 
ways: they fashioned a historiography that served to cast the Polish Bund as most 
deserving of aid by virtue of past friendship with American Jewry, services rendered, and 
need; and they placed Bundist leaders within the narrative of Jewish suffering and 
resistance in Poland.  Unzer Tsayt was, as it was for all the Representation’s news and 
ideology, the primary medium of conveyance.   
 
Fashioning History I: “Der Eyker fun Bundizm” 
  One foundational text for history as the Representation sought to teach it is an 
article from the October 1942 issue of Unzer Tsayt entitled “Der Eyker fun Bundizm” 
[“The Principle of Bundism”].  The article is a reprinting of a speech given by Bundist 
leader Henryk Erlich eight years before at a “jubilee celebration” of the Bund, a speech 
that “[has] remained unusually valuable and real.”1  “Der Eyker fun Bundizm” offers a 
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comprehensive account of the Bund’s history, concentrating on the period from its 
genesis in 1897 until the conclusion of the Russian Civil War around 1920.   
 The most important function of the article is to convince readers of the 
Representation’s claim that the Polish Bund ought to be the sole recipient of relief from 
Unzer Tsayt readers.  The first section of the article lays out in clear terms what the 
author means when he speaks of the “Bund.”  Readers, he says, must not automatically 
think of the Bund as it existed in its earliest days.  The Bund was formed as an 
organization to express “the social and national aspirations of the Jewish working class,” 
and it did so according to a unique set of principles.  However, he points out that the 
monolithic Bund only existed until 1914 or 1915, when the First World War “tore it into 
separate parts.”  After the war, the Bund was thus sundered: one arm in Russia, one in 
Poland, and several lesser limbs scattered through lands such as Latvia and Rumania.  Of 
these, the Russian arm was quashed by the Bolsheviks and no longer exists, and the 
diminutive branches in other lands have strayed from true Bundist ideology.  Therefore, 
“[w]hen we speak today about the history of the ‘Bund’…we must have in view…the 
‘Bund’ in Poland, the actual heir of the former ‘Bund.’”2  
 This bold claim achieves several ends.  In the first place, it reassures readers that 
the support of American Jews for the Bund in its early days was no ill, for in those early 
days the Bund was possessed of noble principles and was the greatest advocate of the 
Jewish working class in Eastern Europe.  It also identifies the Polish Bund in the 
strongest terms as the only legitimate successor to this fragmented movement by virtue of 
its preservation of those same principles.  It concludes that the energies and finances of 
Jews in America are best spent aiding the Polish Bund, the only contingent that can still 
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claim such tenets and goals, precisely because it was these traits as much as the Bund’s 
advocacy for Jews that made it the ideal vanguard from the start.       
 The first principle that the Bund advanced, according to the article, is the 
“organizational principle,” the belief that each ethnicity in a state should be represented 
by an autonomous organization within a single statewide political party.3  It is not 
immediately obvious why this “organizational principle” should endear the Polish Bund 
to Jews in New York City and prompt them to offer it their support, especially since it 
existed as an independent political party in the Second Polish Republic.  The article 
bridges this apparent dichotomy by juxtaposing the ideology and fate of the Polish Bund 
with those of Jewish socialists in New York. 
 “Der Eyker fun Bundizm” begins its advocacy of the organizational principle by a 
theoretical approach.  It does not refer to Jews specifically, nor to any other ethnicity; the 
claim of the article is that the organizational principle benefits all nationalities.  The 
organizational principle benefits all nationalities.  The article explains that a statewide 
party needs autonomous ethnic components for two reasons: first, they allow the party to 
tailor its platforms and policies to the needs of its minority constituents, and second, only 
an organization that “awoke in the bosom of [its] given working class” can “penetrat[e] 
into the depths of the working people” of their respective group and rally them to 
Socialism.4  The benefit of the organizational principle is felt both ways: ethnic 
minorities within a state possess a conduit through which to shape policy relevant to 
them, and Socialism itself is able to extend its roots deeper into sources of support that 
might otherwise remain untapped.  
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 According to the article, Jewish Socialists in Poland (i.e., the Bund) and in 
America observed the organizational principle.  It points out that the Bund was an active 
contributor to the founding of the Russian Social Democratic Workers’ Party (RSDWP), 
and existed in its natural role as the Jewish organization within the party while striving to 
ease factional struggles.  This account is accurate, though it does not mention that 
national-cultural autonomy was not initially part of the Bund’s official platform, and that 
the RSDWP did not recognize the Bund as the sole representative of the Jewish 
proletariat.5  The Bund in the Second Polish Republic existed as a separate political party 
not by choice, but because the Polish proletariat was unwilling to “depart from its 
national limitation” and support a socialist party for all citizens of Poland.  The article 
stresses that the Polish Bund did not embrace “‘separatism,’” nor did it abandon its 
organizational principle.  Conditions in Poland were simply not “ripe.”6  Again, despite 
the obvious bias, history is not misreported: in Poland, the Bund refused to place 
candidates on the election lists of other parties or even to seek alliances with them.7 
 This spin on history present in “Der Eyker fun Bundizm” is a necessary 
justification for the existence of the Polish Bund as a separate party in Poland, which 
would constitute a failure to realize the organizational principle.  The Representation’s 
historiography portrays a Bund eager to carry out the principle, but sabotaged by 
conditions that did not accommodate it.  However, if the Polish Bund in the article (and 
in history) failed to integrate into the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) or some other national 
party, it did not fail in the other task of every national “organization”: advocating for its 
ethnic constituency.  The article demonstrates this by mentioning that the PPS recognizes 
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the right of Jews to use the Yiddish language in schools, courts, and administration.  This 
Bund initiative and its success are corroborated by history: the Polish Bund established 
many secular Yiddish schools as part of its broader campaign for national-cultural 
autonomy, and these school systems thrived within the Second Polish Republic.8 
 “Der Eyker fun Bundizm” cites the Jewish labor movement in America as a 
“positive example” of the organizational principle in action,9 but does not offer further 
details.  However, in order to advance the Representation’s claim that the Bund has 
historical importance to the Jews of New York City, the claim likely refers to the efforts 
of the Bund and several closely related groups in the New York City area, which were 
roughly contemporary with the aforementioned activities of the early Russian Bund and 
the Polish Bund and do appear to embody the organizational principle.  Unfortunately, 
like their peers across the Atlantic, the American Bundists failed to fully realize the 
principle.   
 In A Fire in Their Hearts, Tony Michels notes the irony that in Russia the 
RSDWP refused to accept the Bund’s autonomy, while in America the Socialist Party 
itself proposed the JSF’s autonomy.  The contrast of the Bund’s fates in the two lands 
goes even further: Bundists in imperial Russia and independent Poland could claim 
success in the realm of national cultural autonomy by virtue of the school systems and 
other social infrastructure they established.  In New York City, by contrast, Michels 
concludes that the JSF’s Jewish national program went unrealized.  However, for the 
historiographic purposes of the Representation, writing in 1942, the campaign could be 
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considered a success: an autonomous Jewish Socialist organization existed within the 
American Socialist Party, and it conducted activities to benefit its constituency such as 
promoting women’s suffrage and offering classes on “‘how to become a citizen’” to 
recent immigrants.10  The work of the landsmanshaftn and the Arbeter Ring honored 
(albeit unwittingly) the Bund’s organizational principle: the groups fostered Yiddish 
cultural life while assuming leadership roles in addressing the more practical 
socioeconomic problems of the Jewish people.   
 As a foil for the success stories of the early monolithic Bund, its successor the 
Polish Bund, and their peers in New York City--all of whom adhered to the 
organizational principle--the article offers the “negative demonstration” of the Soviet 
Union, which “cast away” the organizational principle of the Bund and forced it to 
“dissolve” into the general Communist Party.  This was, by the article’s own admission, 
not the result of a specifically anti-Jewish campaign by the Soviet regime, as Soviet Jews 
live no worse off than Gentile Soviet citizens, but unsurprisingly the article is most 
concerned with the effect of this sweeping policy on the Soviet Union’s Jewish citizenry.  
Because there is no organization to advocate for Soviet Jews, they are faced with great 
sufferings that go unaddressed either because the government is responding poorly to all 
domestic issues or because the Jews’ problems are not effectively communicated to it.11  
The article decries the Soviet practice as Communism of the “Prussian barracks” and 
reaffirms the Bund’s loyalty to strict Marxism,12 echoing the stance of the Bund in the 
United States. 
                                                
10 Tony Michels, A Fire in Their Hearts: Yiddish Socialists in New York (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
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11 Henryk Erlich, “Der Eyker fun Bundizm,” Unzer Tsayt, October 1942, 9-10. 
12 Ibid., 11. 
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 To summarize: the article “Der Eyker fun Bundizm,” a reprint of a speech given 
by Henryk Erlich in 1934, is a cornerstone of the Representation’s attempt at presenting 
its own interpretation of history to its readership.  The article begins by proclaiming that 
the Polish Bund is the true heir of the early monolithic Bund before its fracture in World 
War I.  It defends this claim by arguing that the Polish Bund, among offshoots of the 
Bund in different regions, most successfully practiced the “organizational principle” of 
the Bund.  The organizational principle holds that the purpose of the Bund is to serve as 
an autonomous Jewish component of a given country’s Socialist party, making the voices 
of Jewish Socialists heard to the broader party and fostering secular Yiddish culture 
among its Jewish constituency.  The article defends the worth of this principle by way of 
comparative histories: the Polish Bund and American Jewish Socialists serve as positive 
examples of the principle in action, while the lack of a Russian Bund observant of the 
principle is cited as the cause of present Jewish misery in the Soviet Union. 
 “Der Eyker fun Bundizm” offers some detail as to why the Polish Bund is a 
positive example of the organizational principle realized, but no details as to why 
American Jewish Socialism is also positive.  This detail must be derived from the 
exploits of American Jewish Socialists in the 20th century prior to the Second World War.  
Russian Bundists arriving in New York City after the 1905 revolution established 
organizations such as the Jewish Socialist Agitation Bureau and the Jewish Socialist 
Federation to bring Jewish Socialists into the fold of the American Socialist Party and to 
develop a “Yiddish culture” among them.  Following the dissolution of these 
organizations, other entities like the landsmanshaftn and the Arbeter Ring continued the 
work of cultural construction and raised aid on behalf of Jewish Socialists back in Eastern 
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Europe.  By the Bund’s definition, these Jewish Socialist movements in America, 
particularly in New York City, adhered to the organizational principle, whether they did 
so under the banner of the Bund or not.  The intention of the article is to prove to readers 
that the histories of the Polish Bund and American Jewish Socialism intertwine and 
mirror one another, justifying aid from New York City to occupied Poland channeled 
through the Representation.   
 A natural and perfectly justified reaction to the claim I have presented in this 
section is that I have not truly proven that the Representation referred to the events in the 
history of New York City Jewry that I described when it called American Jewish 
Socialism a positive example.  I believe that the strongest evidence that my claim is 
correct lies in an earlier article in Unzer Tsayt, from the issue of March 1941.  It is 
entitled “Bund un Bundizm” [“Bund and Bundism”], and it is another vital component in 
the Representation’s effort to use history in order to inspire charity in its readers.  Where 
“Der Eyker fun Bundizm” fashions a shared history of the Polish Bund and New York 
City’s Jewish Socialists based primarily on theory, viz. the organizational principle, 
“Bund un Bundizm” grounds this history more concretely: while its American historical 
examples are no more specific than in “Der Eyker fun Bundizm,” the claim that it lays 
upon them is far more explicit: “Bund un Bundizm” credits the Bund with all the 
accomplishments of Jewish Socialists in the United States.  
 
Fashioning History II: “Bund un Bundizm” 
 Though published one year earlier (March 1941), the article “Bund un Bundizm” 
[“Bund and Bundism”], by Y. Levine-Shatskes, is an ideal complement to “Der Eyker 
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fun Bundizm” because of the two purposes it serves: it establishes the Bund’s claim to all 
the good works that American Jewish Socialism achieved, and it turns an eye toward the 
future of American Jewish Socialism.  An examination of this article concludes this 
chapter’s treatment of the Representation’s historiography.   
 “Bund un Bundizm” begins in a very technical, almost choppy manner.  Its first 
paragraph offers effective summary of the main argument: 
Bundism is not ordinary Socialism, but Jewish Socialism, that is, 
Socialism that is appropriate for the wants and needs of the Jewish masses.  
The “Bund” is Bundism in action, that is, the Jewish Socialist movement.    
 
There are two points in this opening statement that should be noted.  First, no geographic 
location is specified as the home of Bundism.  Second, and less obvious until later in the 
article, there exists no other manifestation of Jewish Socialism except for the Bund.13  
The full implications of these two points emerge as the article progresses, and constitute 
both praise for the past of American Jewish Socialism and responsibility for the present. 
 The reason that the opening paragraph does not mention geography is that the 
Representation acknowledges that the living conditions of Jews vary from place to place 
and from age to age (e.g., czarist Poland and interwar Poland).  Thus, each branch of the 
Bund will be different from its counterpart in a different land not because it is any better 
or worse, but because it is the appropriate Bund for the “wants and needs” of Jewry there.  
The first hint of the importance of the statement that Bundism is the Jewish Socialist 
movement is the claim that pseudo-Socialist movements opposed the Bund but ultimately 
could not overcome it because they lacked its “living contact” with the Jewish masses.14     
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14 Ibid., 33. 
38  
 “Bund un Bundizm” describes the hardships unique to Jewish Socialism in 
America.  First, the efforts of Jewish Socialists were met with derision from imagined 
onlookers, who decried their foreign Socialist ideology and mocked their failure to 
“‘make a life’ in the golden land.”  Next, the efforts themselves, though valiant, were 
often haphazard and ineffective.  The author employs the metaphor of a farm, cursed with 
poor soil for sowing and reaping the fruits of Socialism.  As an added burden, the broader 
American Socialist movement is impotent, and this naturally weakens its Jewish 
contingent.  Lastly, the presence of such hostility and futility is often enough to turn an 
American Jew away from Socialism.  He loses his desire to help a flagging movement 
and finds himself drawn toward a more vibrant one, whose ideology he slowly accepts.15 
 And yet for all these shortcomings, continues the article, American Jewish 
Socialism has enjoyed several significant triumphs.  Here in America, workers who were 
not daunted by setbacks banded together to create “labor institutions,” presumably a 
reference to mutual aid societies such as the landsmanshaftn and Arbeter Ring.  Abroad, 
Jewish Socialists in the clutches of the Gestapo have been rescued by the Jewish Labor 
Committee (JLC), a product of the American Jewish labor movement.  The JLC “did not 
fall from heaven.”  Rather, it was born from enthusiasm and action on the part of an 
admittedly small and weak movement.  These feats demonstrate the great potential of the 
Jewish Socialist movement in America, if only the American Jewish masses would 
support it and expand it.16   
 All discussion of Bundism adapting to the character of whatever state it resides in 
and the uniquely American hardships that confronted Jewish Socialists there pivots 
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39  
around the climactic claim of the article: “The Jewish Socialist movement in America is 
the Bundist movement here, independent of whether it carries the name of ‘Bund’ or 
not.”17  This claim echoes the article’s opening, which held that any manifestation of 
Jewish Socialism is Bundism, even if its practitioners are unaware of that.  By this 
definition, even American Jewish Socialist movements that were at work before the 
Bundists’ arrival or never counted a single Bundist among their ranks are parts of the 
Bund.  In this single sentence, “Bund un Bundizm” stakes the Bund’s claim to all facets 
of American Jewish Socialism: its triumphs, its failures, its potential for greatness, and its 
propensity for lassitude.  All societal advancements effected by the landsmanshaftn and 
Arbeter Ring, all Yiddish cultural flowerings, all aid raised for and sent to Eastern 
Europe, are credited to the Bund.    
 It was the American Bundists, continues the article, who provided the years of 
Socialist enlightenment and education that galvanized the Jewish masses to form the 
JLC18 and rescue their brethren from fascist oppression.  This is proof that great potential 
lies within the American Bundist movement, and the movement can realize this potential 
so long as it does not stray from the tenets of Bundism.  The Bund in America is a part of 
the same “choir,” or “Socialist world orchestra” as the Bund in Poland.  Because of this, 
the best course of action for American Jews is to put hand and shoulder to work in 
strengthening the movement in America.  This will shape the future of Jews in America, 
Jews yet to come to America, and Jews who remain in Europe.  The article concludes by 
noting the responsibility of American Jews to advance Socialism and democracy in the 
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40  
world, particularly at such a time as World War II, when Socialism and democracy are 
opposed by forces of “arbitraries and slavery.”19 
 Read together, the articles “Der Eyker fun Bundizm” (October 1942) and“Bund 
un Bundizm” (March 1941) comprise a concise presentation of the historical narrative 
that the Representation sought to instill in readers of Unzer Tsayt.  “Der Eyker fun 
Bundizm” identifies the Polish Bund as the sole legitimate heir to the original Bund 
because it has continued the original Bund’s practice of the “organizational principle,” in 
which an ethnic organization exists as an autonomous group within a larger party, 
advocating for the group and seeing to its internal needs.  “Der Eyker fun Bundizm” 
considers the Polish Bund and the American Jewish Socialist movement to be successful 
examples of the organizational principle in practice, as they created better conditions for 
Jewish labor in those lands than in the Soviet Union, which no longer has a Bund.  “Bund 
un Bundizm” explicitly labels any form of Jewish Socialism in America as Bundism in 
America and offers a defense of the maligned and rather dormant American Jewish 
Socialism, saying that if the American Bund musters the necessary drive, it can and has 
achieved good works for Jews in America and in Eastern Europe.  “Bund un Bundizm” 
concludes by exhorting readers to lend their efforts to their Socialist movement in this 
crucial time. 
 These two articles also encapsulate the Representation’s fundraising pitch 
expressed throughout runs of Unzer Tsayt: the Representation reminds readers that its 
parent league, the Bund, enlightened and encouraged American Jewish Socialists and 
spurred them on to great deeds.  Now American Jewish Socialism needs similar industry 
from the populace in order to once again aid the beleaguered Polish Bund, which has 
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historically been of such great benefit to Polish Jews and is their best hope of surviving 
the present war.20   
 
Chronicling the Holocaust 
 Of course, the Representation did not use Unzer Tsayt solely for the purpose of 
transmitting abstract ideology.  The newspaper’s primary aim was to report relevant 
news.  This meant that virtually every issue contained one or several articles devoted to 
the plight of Jews in occupied Poland.  In the first year of Unzer Tsayt’s circulation, it 
addressed oppressed Polish Jews very generally in a campaign to rouse readers to outrage 
about apparently inactive governments and to action of their own (i.e. contributions to 
relief funds).  But beginning with the January 1942 issue, Unzer Tsayt also reported the 
fates of Bundist leaders Henryk Erlich and Viktor Alter after their re-arrest,21 and after 
reports of their deaths reached the United States in 1943, the two men were folded into 
the broader chronicle of tragedy.22  (The story of Erlich and Alter is told later in this 
chapter.)  Other individual tales of the Holocaust later emerged in the Representation’s 
1944 volume Geto in flamn [Ghetto in Flames], and were similarly appropriated.  
 The October 1942 article “Veygeshri fun der Yidisher Bafelkerung in Poyln” 
[“Cry of Pain from the Jewish Population in Poland”] is a good example of the tales of 
anonymous victims that characterized the early reports of Unzer Tsayt.  The article is a 
                                                
20 These two articles effectively summarize the Representation’s historical outlook, but they are not the 
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reprint of a speech given on September 2, 1942 at an “international meeting” in London 
by Szmuel Zygielbojm, a Bundist who lived and worked there during the war.  The 
article does not lack figures and anecdotes for the arousal of pathos in its readers.  
“[S]ources in our country [Poland]” report rates of starvation and tolls of mass 
executions, and among the stories is a description of mothers gassed while their infant 
children suckled.23  However, not a single name is provided.  Ultimately, though, this 
does not matter.  In concluding his speech, Zygielbojm proclaims: 
As a representative of these masses, I bring to the attention their outcry of 
pain and protest and their call to humanity to find ways to stop the greatest 
crimes in human history!...[T]here will be no one to save in Europe if we 
do not find the way at this time to protect the population of Poland and of 
other occupied lands.24 
 
The audience of the speech and Jews in New York City reading the Yiddish-language 
transcript of it need only know that there are masses of suffering Jews in Poland in need 
of help.  Because the speaker is a Bundist proclaiming himself to be a “representative of 
these masses” and the speech was relayed to them by the Representation’s newspaper, 
New York City Jews reading Unzer Tsayt would have concluded that the surest way of 
contributing would be through the Representation and its affiliated organizations. 
 But it was not only with New York City’s Jews in mind that the Representation 
wrote of victims: during the war, the American Jewish collective consciousness became 
something of a battleground for both governmental and non-governmental propaganda 
efforts.  In particular, the Polish government-in-exile kept its finger on the pulse of 
American Jewish public opinion in order to marshal support for its cause and monitor the 
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success of the Soviet Union’s “information efforts” among American Jewry.25  Aware of 
this influence held by its readership and seeking, perhaps, to muster visible support for its 
emissary to the Polish government-in-exile in London, Zygielbojm, the Representation 
issued several articles in Unzer Tsayt about the government-in-exile, occasionally 
utilizing the Jewish plight.  One such article was April 1942’s “Un vu zaynen di 
maysim?” [“And where are the Actions?”].  This diatribe against empty gestures on the 
part of the London Government concerning Polish Jews deals with the victims far more 
harshly than does “Veygeshri.”  Its opening paragraphs mock the Polish government-in-
exile, pointing out that “[t]he present government over Poland has its own way to solve 
the Jewish Question,” and that the government-in-exile is powerless to ameliorate the 
situation.26  It is language crafted to elicit anger rather than pathos.  Printed in a New 
York City-based Yiddish newspaper, this harangue would have had no direct effect on 
the London Government.  Instead, the motivation behind this article is clearly to foster 
outrage among readers and promote the opinion that the Polish government-in-exile 
should take more decisive action to aid its beleaguered Jewish constituents in the hope 
that the government would detect this opinion and respond accordingly.      
 Before the war, Henryk Erlich and Viktor Alter had served on the Central 
Committee of the Bund in Poland.  When German forces invaded Poland, the two men 
did not immediately flee Warsaw, being among those who advocated defending Warsaw 
alongside the Polish workers.  However, when the Central Committee voted to flee, 
Erlich and Alter made for Lublin, southeast of Warsaw, before Wehrmacht movements 
prompted them to instead move more directly eastward toward Soviet lines.  They 
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became separated and were arrested separately by Soviet police in late September 1939, 
and were imprisoned and interrogated until June 1941.  Blatman explains that the Soviets 
regarded Erlich in particular as the highest-ranking Polish political leader they had 
captured and interrogated the two men primarily concerning Socialist political activity in 
interwar Poland and their Socialist connections in Western Europe.  A Soviet military 
tribunal convicted them of sedition and collaboration with opponents of the regime and 
sentenced them to death, but they were released soon after as part of Josef Stalin’s ploy to 
garner Western support in the midst of some of his country’s darkest days of the war.27   
 Once released, they began working in the Soviet project of creating a “Jewish 
committee that would help mobilize Western Jewish public opinion for the Soviet war 
effort.”  The two men established the Jewish anti-Hitlerist Committee (ŻKA), and in 
October 1941 they sent a memorandum to Stalin and Lavrenty Beria (head of the NKVD, 
the Soviet secret police) detailing its objectives.  They wanted the ŻKA to provide relief 
to Polish Jewish refugees who reached the Soviet Union, recruit American Jewish 
volunteers to form a legion on the Eastern Front, assist the Jewish underground in Poland, 
and “act on behalf” of Jews in German-occupied lands.  This agenda would have made 
the ŻKA an autonomous entity able to collaborate with other organizations and 
governments.  Erlich and Alter were already in contact with supporters in Britain and the 
United States.28  It was too much for the NKVD, which rearrested them on similar 
charges of foreign entanglements in December 1941, executing Alter by firing squad on 
February 17, 1943.  Erlich had already hanged himself the previous year.29  
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 Upon learning that Erlich and Alter were once again imprisoned, the 
Representation began a campaign to have them freed, but to no avail.  The American and 
British governments, neither of whom wished to sour relations with the Soviet Union in 
the wake of its heroic defense of Stalingrad, labeled the matter a Soviet internal affair and 
said nothing more.  The Polish government-in-exile used the two men as a point of debate 
concerning the citizenship of displaced persons.  According to Daniel Blatman, news of 
Erlich’s and Alter’s deaths was regarded by the Representation as a death knell of Polish 
Jewry.  They despaired at their inability to save such important leaders and at the purging 
of their beloved party’s structure.30  
 The Representation recast this despair into a dire call for action.  One instance of 
this transformation occurs in the April 1943 issue of Unzer Tsayt, which reported of the 
deaths of Erlich and Alter in its front page article and in several other articles within the 
same issue.31  On the 19th of the same month, the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising began, and 
this same issue of Unzer Tsayt contains an article about it.  The conclusion of the article 
concerning the Uprising contains this excerpt: 
In this call [from the ghetto fighters] lives the spirit of generations of 
Jewish revolutionary fighters.  In it the deep traces of Erlich, Alter, and 
other unforgettable people are felt; it is a worthy service… [to] the defense 
of Warsaw in September 1939, [to] heroic underground. 
 
In this call a further demand to the world is heard: do not silence our 
tragedy, do not let a people be annihilated!32 
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 The Representation wasted no time inducting Erlich and Alter into its chronicle of 
Jewish victimhood.  The very same issue that reports their deaths also uses them as a 
reason to extol the Warsaw Ghetto fighters and places them in the same tradition of 
heroism that began with the 1939 defense of Warsaw and continued with underground 
activists.  All elements of this tradition issue a call to the world not to allow the 
annihilation of Polish Jews.  Since this call is being communicated in Yiddish, the onus 
of alerting the world and thus preventing annihilation falls on Jewish readers in New 
York City.  The Representation’s fears for the future of Polish Jewry did not halt its 
appeals for action, but rather fueled new ones.  Articles specifically about Erlich and 
Alter grew sparser following April 1943, but articles lamenting the plight of Jews in 
Poland and calling for action from readers remained a regular feature. 
 The 1944 collection Geto in flamn [Ghetto in Flames] contains essays about 
events in Poland and elsewhere.  The essays about occupied Poland focus almost entirely 
on the stories of individuals, most of whom are Bundists.  Nonetheless, these personal 
accounts contain references to the Bund’s past and to its anti-Zionist stance, thus 
advancing the same messages that the Representation presented in Unzer Tsayt.  The 
piece “Der Untererdisher ‘Bund’” [“The Underground Bund”], for example, describes 
heroes such as F.J. Zilberberg, a young Bundist whom the Nazis tortured in front of his 
wife in order to obtain information about Bundist documents.  He did not yield the 
information.  It also describes the relief work that the Bund carried out, such as 
establishing soup kitchens.  “‘We do all this,’” reads a Bundist report quoted in the essay, 
“‘because we are full of the will to accomplish our task…our work is dictated by a 
stubborn will to struggle with the enemy…it is…our glorious tradition of socialist 
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struggle.’”  Another quoted report rejected “‘every emigration solution of the Jewish 
Question,’” referring to Zionism.33  The essay “Der Nes fun Ufshtand” [“The Miracle of 
Resistance”] describes several episodes from the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising before 
concluding, “the heroes in the ghettos were…heirs of generations.”34  Though the volume 
is dominated by individual narratives, it is careful to insert them into the same general 
Bundist history as other reports of the Holocaust by the Representation. 
 In January 1944, Franklin D. Roosevelt announced the formation of the War 
Refugee Board and assigned it $1 million dollars in funding.  The purpose of the War 
Refugee Board was the “rescue and relief of ‘the victims of enemy oppression.’”  
However, the Board’s efforts promptly stalled: leaders of the U.S. Treasury Department 
such as Hans Morgenthau were eager to proceed, but figures from the State Department 
hesitated, arguing that the Nazis would likely requisition any aid supplies send to the 
ghettos and that the United States was not prepared to handle the outright rescue of Jews 
in occupied lands.35  The following March, Unzer Tsayt ran an article by Shloime 
Mendelsohn, who began by briefly announcing the creation of the War Refugee Board 
and then used the rest of the first page to harangue the American government for waiting 
until 1944 to take this step when the slaughter of Jews had begun years before and the 
Jews of Poland had already engaged in tragic, heroic resistance.36 
 Additionally, the article faults American Jewish society for sharing in this 
“defeatist passivity.”  The final section of the article is a call for continued action on the 
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Jews’ part.  “The American board is…unable to accomplish much,” proclaimed 
Mendelsohn.  “All is dependent on whether the board will quickly swim 
over…proceedings and propaganda and will pass to actions.”  The creation of the Board, 
he concluded, ought to “stimulate a strengthening of activism” on the part of Jewish 
organizations, whose responsibility it now was “to help the board and make demands of 
it.”37  An article that begins as a simple news report draws upon the language of suffering 
and heroism to reach its climax pleading for further aid.   
 Accounts of Jewish suffering in occupied Poland had a regular presence in issues 
of Unzer Tsayt.  During the first two years of the newspaper’s run, such articles spoke in 
general terms and sought to accomplish several goals.  Some articles, like “Veygeshri fun 
der Yidisher Bafelkerung in Poyln,” made direct appeals to the Jewish readers of Unzer 
Tsayt in New York City to contribute to relief efforts.  Others, like “Un vu zaynen di 
Maysim?,” were intended as catalysts of a particular opinion.  “Un vu zaynen di 
Maysim?” looked to stir outrage directed at the Polish government-in-exile.  Following 
the deaths of Henryk Erlich and Viktor Alter, those two respected and beloved Bundist 
leaders became a part of the continuum of woe.  Tales of individual heroism in the 
volume Geto in flamn also harkened to the Bund’s tradition of service and sacrifice for 
the Jews.  Even Franklin Roosevelt’s creation of the War Refugee Board was an occasion 
for Representation leader Shloime Mendelsohn to recount Jewish suffering and resistance 
in Poland and to urge his readers on to even greater outpouring of support.  The 
Representation’s tales of Jewish victims in the General Government were ubiquitous 
appeals to their readers’ sense of solidarity with their brethren across the ocean and 
warnings that the wider American society could not be relied upon to save them.    
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 Though the Representation claimed that the first item on its and the American 
government’s agenda ought to be saving the Jews of Europe who remained alive,38 a 
secondary but significant effort both in print and in its dealings with other groups aimed 
at resisting the American Zionist camp.  The theoretical criticisms of Zionism that the 
Representation presented in Unzer Tsayt can be reduced to this: the very tenets of 
Bundism that made it the ideology Jews should adopt were violated or rejected outright 
by Zionists.  While the Bund urged Jews to remain in their countries of residence, support 
the Socialist movement of that country, and forge a Jewish culture around the Yiddish 
language, Zionists (the Representation claimed), desired that Jews emigrate to Palestine 
or at least assign it primacy in their thoughts and that they forsake Yiddish for Hebrew.  
Bundism maintained hope that Jew and Gentile could coexist in a true Socialist world in 
all lands.  The Zionism described in critical Unzer Tsayt articles abandoned all faith in 
Jewish Diaspora life, dismissing not only the accomplishments of Jews there, but the 
feasibility of national coexistence and of democracy.  In the Representation’s eyes, the 
most important consequence of the radical differences between the two movements was 
that Bundism offered a solution to the Jewish Question (put simply, what is the place of 
Jews in Europe?), whereas Zionism benefited only Palestine.  Additionally, Zionism’s 
conviction that Jews would only prosper in a state of their own demonstrated a rejection 
of the democracy and ethnic coexistence that the United States championed.  The 
practical critiques of Zionism were that a Jewish state in Palestine would not be self-
sustaining, and would be constantly in need of charity from the Diaspora, and that the 
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creation of a Jewish state would effectively strip the Jews of citizenship in the other 
countries where they lived, forcing assimilation upon them.  “Between ‘Diaspora’ and 
Palestine,” proclaimed Unzer Tsayt, “there is no possible balance…[A]ll that Palestine 
accomplishes is at complete odds with the Jewish life of the ‘Diaspora,’ and no peace is 
possible between them.”39  This distinction between abstract and practical critiques is 
imperfect, and some articles of Unzer Tsayt can reside in either category, but I consider it 
a useful one because it demonstrates that the Representation attempted to discredit 
Zionism in the same realms wherein it lauded the Bund: the theoretical and the actual.  
By thus defining the opposition in Unzer Tsayt, the Representation sharpened the image 
readers would have of the Bund.       
 The Representation was responding to a Zionist movement that had been steadily 
growing in size and influence in the United States since its beginning (at roughly the 
same time as Jewish Socialism), and whose growth had spiked in the latter half of the 
1930s.  The first section of this chapter will chronicle this rise of American Zionism until 
the Second World War in order to better contextualize the Representation’s animosity, 
fear, and activity.  In the second section of this chapter, I detail the criticisms that the 
Representation leveled against their Zionist contemporaries in Unzer Tsayt, which 
included both ideological and practical arguments.  I begin with the Representation’s 
defense of Yiddish as the mother tongue of the Jews, not to be subjugated by Hebraists in 
Palestine; and of the so-called “Diaspora,” which Zionists disparaged but which the Bund 
lauded.  Next, I focus on an article called “Der Eyker fun Tsiyonizm” [“The Principle of 
Zionism”], wherein Representation leader Emanuel Nowogrodzki both defends Bundism 
from a Zionist’s accusations and disputes the Zionist position on the same points.  I 
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consider “Der Eyker fun Tsiyonizm” the magnum opus of the Representation in its anti-
Zionist writings because the points of debate are so fundamental to the Bundism-Zionism 
conflict and because the title harkens to “Der Eyker fun Bundizm.”  Finally, I examine 
the Representation’s claim that a Jewish State in Palestine would threaten the status of 
Jews remaining in the Diaspora.  
 
The Life of American Zionism 
 The story of American Zionism begins in the late-19th-century Russian Empire.  
Zionism, which at its most basic desires the return of the Jewish people to the Land of 
Israel, originated in this time and place because Russian Jews were becoming 
increasingly insecure in their homeland.  In his book The Emergence of American 
Zionism, Mark Raider explains that the Jews of Western and Central Europe did not 
initially embrace Zionism because they had already assimilated to various degrees and 
had undergone legal emancipation.  Jews of the Russian Empire, however, still lived 
primarily in cloistered, segregated communities under more restrictive imperial laws.  In 
their isolation, Russian Jews either lived according to strong traditional law and ritual or 
embraced the Haskalah (Jewish Enlightenment), which emerged in the early 19th century 
and promoted spiritual renewal and Hebrew revival along with some acculturation in 
Russian society.40  Raider casts the first proto-Zionists as rebels against both these trends, 
“arrayed against the camps of both Western assimilationism and Eastern religious 
orthodoxy.”41  One of the forerunners to Zionism (the term was not coined until 189042) 
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was the movement Hibbat Zion [Love of Zion], which emerged in 1881 and advocated 
use of the Hebrew language, emigration to Palestine, and establishment there of self-
sufficient agricultural settlements.43  Even before Zionism and Bundism were officially 
established, early proponents of those ideologies, such as members of Hibbat Zion or the 
Vilna movement, engaged in debate.44 
 It was not only with other parties or ideological opponents that Zionists 
contended.  Like Bundists, Zionists feuded among themselves on the issue of how their 
ideology would take effect amid the realities of Jewish life in the Russian Empire, the 
United States, or elsewhere.  Two of the earliest Zionist camps were Political Zionism 
(championed by Theodor Herzl), which looked to establish a Jewish State through 
political means, such as negotiations with the Ottoman Empire or Great Britain; and 
Practical Zionism, which made its priority the settlement of Palestine while it was still 
under Ottoman rule.  Several other divisions of Zionism existed; future President of the 
State of Israel Chaim Weizmann coined the term “Synthetic Zionism” in 1908 as a 
merger of Political and Practical Zionisms’ goals.   
 Synthetic Zionism espoused the doctrine of Gegenwartsarbeit [“present work”], 
which called for Jewish revival in the Diaspora before the Jewish State was formed.  This 
project took such forms as schools for Modern Hebrew, the establishment of Jewish 
sports clubs (Bar Kokhba, which later became the Maccabi Games, was founded in this 
time), and the participation of Jewish parties in secular politics to represent Jewish (and 
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Zionist) interests.45  Engaging in Gegenwartsarbeit in the Russian Empire, Zionists 
would have interacted with a constituency that overlapped the Bund’s.  I found no 
mention of Gegenwartsarbeit in my reading of Unzer Tsayt, but the July 1942 article 
“Yidishe Akhodes” [“Jewish Unity”] faults  
those who, because of ‘higher Jewish interests’ (simply a friendly word for 
Zionism) bowed in the ministerial corridors and in the Gentile pro-
Palestine committees before the…fascist Polish government.46  
 
Presumably, this echoes earlier Bundist objections to that and other components of 
Gegenwartsarbeit. Several Zionist luminaries vehemently opposed Gegenwartsarbeit,47 
and so to participate in it constituted a definite identification with one form of Zionism 
and not another.   
 A crucial moment in the development of Zionism within the Russian Empire was 
the 1881 assassination of Czar Alexander II.  The wave of pogroms that followed 
increased the popularity of Hibbat Zion.48  A significant number of Jews emigrated to the 
United States.  There, the atmosphere of freedom and tolerance coupled with the presence 
of already-established Jewish communities and communal organizations allowed the 
infant proto-Zionist movement to expand and splinter into camps like the Labor Zionists, 
who viewed the Zionist enterprise as a Socialist enterprise, and the Religious Zionists, 
whose vision of Jewish life in Palestine was one lived according to Halakha (Jewish 
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law).49  However, the most important group in this period remained Hibbat Zion.  In the 
United States, Hibbat Zion assumed a more nationalist character than other Jewish 
movements and engaged more with the existing leadership of American Jewry.  It won 
over many leaders in religion or the Jewish press to its cause, but also encountered 
opposition from groups such as the Central Conference of American Rabbis (a national 
association of Reform Jewish rabbis), which explained that Jews were a religious 
community rather than a national one, and a national conference of Jewish labor leaders, 
which affirmed the importance of the Yiddish language and renounced any presence of a 
“Jewish Question” in America.  Ultimately, later Zionist movements absorbed or 
supplanted Hibbat Zion, but Raider identifies it as the movement whose far reach and 
nationalist rhetoric made Zionism on the model of Theodor Herzl feasible in the United 
States.50       
 The turn of the 20th century was the moment at which Zionism emerged in the 
United States, and it emerged at that time for multiple reasons.  Perhaps the most obvious 
and important cause was the person of Theodor Herzl.  Herzl’s writings, such as his book 
Der Judenstaat [The Jewish State], made an early case for Political Zionism.51  Another 
formative event was the 1903 Kishinev Pogrom, which became the “archetypal pogrom” 
of Eastern Europe for world Jewry because of its scale and the literature it inspired.52  
Following the pogrom, Jewish and non-Jewish newspapers alike published personal 
letters that arrived in streams to American Jews from relatives in the area who had 
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witnessed or survived the pogrom.  Jews of all cities and walks of life were horrified at 
what they read and clamored for the resettlement of endangered Russian Jews, some 
pointing to Palestine.  This fervor faded as the violence subsided, revealing to American 
Zionist leaders the link between Jewish crisis and sympathy for Zionism.53       
 No wing of Zionism ever brought all Zionists or Zionists sympathizers into its 
fold, but Labor Zionism (championing a Socialist Jewish State) assembled the largest 
following during the 1910s and dominated the Zionist scene in the United States for 
decades to come.  Raider explains the success of Labor Zionism by three main factors: 
first, it counted among its ranks some of the most influential American Jewish leaders, 
such as Louis Brandeis.  Second, by treating Palestine as “a progressive Jewish society-
in-the-making, rather than as an object of pious devotion,” it did not alienate constituents 
who adhered to a belief in the American Dream and were less strict in their observance 
than the Religious Zionists.  Lastly, Labor Zionism was the incarnation of Zionism most 
attuned to the Yishuv (the Jewish community in Palestine) because it revered the pioneer 
ethos and cooperative efforts of the Yishuv.  Raider concludes that Labor Zionism became 
the “mainstream” Zionism within American Jewry, even if its supporters did not 
consciously choose to support Labor Zionism over some other form.54  It was Labor 
Zionism that would serve as the most effective source and conduit of aid from American 
Jewry to pioneers in Palestine.  
 The main voice of Labor Zionism in the United States was the Poalei Zion 
[Workers of Zion] Party, founded in 1905.  Poalei Zion was the offspring of a radical 
Socialist Zionist party in the Russian Empire, and its early composition and activity 
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reflected this descent.  The party combined an agenda of Labor Zionism with one of 
immigrant self-help.  Unsurprisingly, many party members were primarily interested in 
Labor Zionism the world over and the global effort to erect a Jewish Socialist state in 
Palestine.  However, there were other projects and events more appropriate for Jews more 
interested in the American life.  For example, the party raised money for the pioneers in 
Palestine, but also created local institutions such as cooperative grocery stores and 
bakeries.55  The multifaceted nature of Poalei Zion meant that it could attract and retain a 
diverse following, if not a numerically large one.  Poalei Zion was also a polyglot party.  
Its network of Folkshuln [Peoples’ Schools] around the eastern United States offered 
instruction in the (modern) Hebrew and Yiddish languages, along with classes on the 
Hebrew Bible and Yiddish literature.56   
 Gegenwartsarbeit was alive and well in the United States, and some Jewish 
leaders were opposed to it.  One of the leading newspapers among Jews in New York 
City was the Yiddish-language daily Forverts [Forward].  At first, under the editorship 
of Abraham Cahan, Forverts was at best indifferent and at worst hostile toward 
Zionism.57  Cahan himself wrote an editorial in the May 5, 1921 issue of Forverts entitled 
“Far vos a sotsyalist ken nit zany keyn tsiyonist” [“Why a socialist cannot be a Zionist”].  
Cahan explained that not only was the land of Palestine too small and poor to sustain all 
the Jews of the world, but the very Zionist project to create a Jewish home there was 
“chauvinistic nationalism,” which every Socialist, as an internationalist, had a duty to 
resist.  Poalei Zion, he acknowledged, believed that it had merged Socialism and 
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Zionism, but this was impossible.  Socialism is internationalist and envisions all nations 
living as brothers, while Zionism is distinctly nationalist and wishes for the Jews, a 
thoroughly international people by now, to live apart from other nations.58 
 However, after Cahan took a tour of Palestine in 1925, he became a supporter of 
Labor Zionism, and his journalism reflected this.59  In an article from the Forverts of 
December 15, 1925, Cahan acknowledged that Palestine needed to develop its industry 
and that it would remain only a small Jewish center.  However, it would “always play 
some part in Jewish life.”  Cahan concluded the piece by saying, “the idealists who 
sacrifice themselves for the building of Eretz Israel and the agricultural 
settlements…deserve…the warmest sentiments and the best wishes of every socialist.”60  
Here and elsewhere, Cahan renounced the view of Bundists (and of his past writings) that 
Zionism and Socialism were incompatible.  Between December 1925 and May 1926, 
Cahan allowed the pages of Forverts played host to a debate between many of the leading 
figures in American Jewish Socialism concerning the relationship between Socialism and 
Zionism in order allow real discussion of the topic.61   
 Baruch Charney-Vladek, a member of the Bund in the Russian Empire who had 
immigrated to the United States in 1908, faulted the Zionist use of the Yiddish language 
to further its aims because Zionism had no interest in the “‘development of Yiddish 
cultural in the Diaspora,’” which ought to have been the true goal of Yiddish education, 
and sought only to advance its ultimate aim of building a Jewish homeland.  David 
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Einhorn, another Bundist immigrant, wrote simply, “‘Zionism is a nationalism that hauls 
us backwards.’”62  Bundist leaders, in short, resented the Zionists’ appropriation of the 
Yiddish language in a network of schools and other institutions that ultimately operated 
for the benefit of the Yishuv, rather than world Jewry as a whole.  
 Despite this opposition in the press, Poalei Zion’s broad appeal allowed it to make 
inroads among American Jewish Socialists, as evidenced by a series of collaborative 
fundraisers for the Yishuv in the 1920s with the United Hebrew Trades, an entity 
promoting cooperation between Jewish Socialist groups.  Even non-Jewish Socialist 
organizations such as the American Federation of Labor expressed sympathy and 
solidarity with the party’s program.63  Unsurprisingly, this resulted in some conflict with 
already established, more internationally oriented Jewish Socialists.  In particular, one 
leader of the Arbeter Ring proclaimed “every member…is in duty bound to be loyal to 
the interests of the labor movement.”  New members of the Arbeter Ring swore an oath to 
join the union of their trade and vote in elections for the candidates of “‘working class 
parties,’” i.e., the Socialist Party or Socialist Labor Party.64   
    Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, Poalei Zion and other Labor Zionist groups 
remained small in number,65 but Labor Zionism’s clout increased due to several social 
and political factors.  Hostility toward Jews in 1920s America manifested itself in 
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immigration restrictions, university quotas, the rhetoric of Henry Ford, and agitation by 
the Ku Klux Klan, and this reactivated the crisis-inspired upwelling of support of 
American Jewry for Zionism.  Labor Zionism remained the most connected to Yishuv 
life, and Poalei Zion in particular reprinted articles from the Hebrew press in Palestine in 
its own newspaper in addition to hosting visiting delegates from the Yishuv, including 
David Ben-Gurion.66  Following the first one in 1924, Poalei Zion fundraising campaigns 
raised more each year, increasing from $50,000 that year to $175,000 in 1930.  But, as 
Raider points out, finances do not tell the complete story: each year, the donations came 
from more and more groups, including mutual aid societies such as the landsmanshaftn.  
Lastly, Labor Zionists reached out to Jewish youth with activities such as summer camps 
(often run by labor leaders from Palestine) and Hebrew schools.  The scope of American 
Gegenvartsarbeit was increasing: Zionist Organization of America (ZOA) president 
Solomon Goldman envisioned “‘a chain of Zionist schools for children throughout the 
country’” where teachers were equipped with “‘guides on Palestine and Zionism’” and 
the “‘ablest young Jewish minds” were “‘nurse[d]…for Jewish and Zionist leadership.’”  
Goldman admitted his goal was beyond the ZOA’s capability, and his particular vision 
was never implemented, but by 1941 an estimated 200,000 or more Jewish children were 
studying in Jewish schools.67   
 Like many groups, Labor Zionist parties’ membership dropped during the first 
years of the Great Depression,68 but the movement was able to survive and even grow in 
influence due to a merger in the United States of Poalei Zion with Zeirei Zion, a Labor 
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Zionist youth movement, and an alliance with several groups in Palestine.  At the 18th 
Zionist Congress (Prague, 1933), Labor Zionists comprised 138 of the 318 delegates, 
their first showing of such dominance within American and world Zionism.69  Additional 
developments in world events sustained dominance of Labor Zionism during the 1930s.  
In its 1937 Columbus Platform, the Central Conference of American Rabbis now publicly 
declared its support for the Histadrut (the umbrella organization of labor in Palestine).  
Reports of Jewish hardships in Nazi Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union also won over 
Americans to the cause.  Lastly, the emergence of Revisionist Zionism as the right wing 
of world Zionism aroused a great deal of distaste among Zionist sympathizers and 
provoked movement within Zionism toward the left wing of Labor Zionism.70  At the 19th 
Zionist Congress (Lucerne, 1935), the Labor Zionists emerged again as the dominant 
faction and bolstered the feat by forging a coalition with the centrist General Zionists.  
Although the actual fraction of the Jewish population that belonged to a Zionist group 
remained small, Mark Raider demonstrates that American Jews were increasingly forced 
to engage with Zionism and construct their identities around it, using labels like “‘non-
Zionism,’ ‘cultural Zionism,’ ‘spiritual Zionism,’ ‘philanthropic Zionism,’ and even 
‘anti-Zionism.’”  Furthermore, popular support for the Yishuv continued to mount even 
while Zionism’s numbers remained low.71  
 On the eve of World War II, American Jewry watched with alarm as Western 
nations refused to admit Jewish refugees streaming out of Germany, and as Great Britain 
imposed restrictions on immigration into Palestine.  In June 1938, representatives of four 
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large Jewish organizations held a meeting in an attempt to craft a unified front and 
strategy, but they were unsuccessful.72  The invasion of Poland in September 1939 
prompted the most lucrative fundraising for the Yishuv yet.  Multiple organizations held 
largely independent campaigns.  That of the National Labor Committee for Palestine 
(NLCP) was essentially a continuation of Poalei Zion’s yearly fundraisers during the 
1920s.  The NLCP and Labor Zionism more generally sought to expand the resources and 
infrastructure of the Yishuv so that it could absorb more “illegal” immigrants (those who 
entered Palestine without British consent) from occupied Europe.  The efforts reached 
more Jews than ever before, and some collaborative efforts in the early 1940s garnered 
millions of dollars.73 
 This was the state of American Zionism at the time of the Bundists’ arrival and 
the formation of the American Representation of the Bund in Poland in 1941.  It was not 
a homogenous movement, and different Zionist parties and groups were given to 
squabbling.  It was not a numerically large movement, never claiming more than 1.5 
percent of the American Jewish population as official members.74  However, Zionism 
was an ideology that every Jew in America had at least encountered, and it commanded 
considerable sympathy even among non-members.  Zionism’s influence, then, was not 
the result of a mass following among American Jews, but of outreach campaigns 
comparable to the East European Gegenvartsarbeit and a ubiquity in American Jewry’s 
collective consciousness.  Zionism also gained political clout in the United States thanks 
in large part to Louis Brandeis, who brought President Woodrow Wilson around to 
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Zionism.  Wilson later supported the Balfour Declaration and gave public support to a 
Jewish National Home.75  As was the case with the Bund in Eastern Europe, American 
Jews demonstrated a propensity for stepping up their vocal and monetary support for 
Zionism and the Yishuv in the wake of traumas to world Jewry such as the Kishinev 
Pogrom or the onset of World War II.  Zionist fundraising efforts of the early 1940s 
gathered the biggest windfall yet.  In short, it was a movement that the Representation 
rightfully viewed and resisted as a rival. 
 
Theoretical and Practical Critiques of Zionism 
 The fundamental fault of Zionism that articles in Unzer Tsayt routinely identify is 
its assumption that addressing the needs of Palestine also addresses the needs of world 
Jewry.  The articles dispute this belief on both immaterial and material grounds.  The 
common thread among theoretical objections is that Palestine and the Diaspora are 
simply destined to remain at odds with one another on matters of ethos.  Jews living in 
Palestine find spiritual or cultural fulfillment in ways very different from Jews in other 
countries.  More concrete detractors of Zionism pointed out that the contemporary Yishuv 
was dependent on the support of world Jewry and saw no reason why this would change 
in the future. 
 It is important to note that the Representation did not make the mistake of 
regarding Zionism as a monolithic movement.  It recognized the multiple schools of 
thought that the Zionist label encompassed and engaged each one.  One of these schools 
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was Cultural Zionism (also called Spiritual Zionism), championed by figures such as 
Aḥad Ha’am (1856-1927).  Ha’am did not envision a Jewish state in Palestine as the 
destination for Jews of the world.  Instead, he hoped that the Jewish state would serve as 
a “spiritual center” for world Jewry, a model of Jewish life for dispersed Jews and a focus 
of their spiritual life.  The presence of a spiritual center would reinvigorate world Jewry 
and instill a new sense of vitality into a religion that had grown stagnant.76  The 
December 1941 article “Palestine un di Yidn-Frage” [“Palestine and the Jewish 
Question”] repudiates the mythos of the spiritual center in Palestine on the grounds that 
“[t]his is a center that has not influenced our life for a few decades,” and that Palestine is 
in “full denial of all that is dear to us.”77  Even Cultural Zionists who supported the 
continuation of Diaspora life were not tolerated by the Representation because the 
Cultural Zionist vision was that the Diaspora would be a community subjugated to the 
practices of the Jewish state.  
 In particular, the rebuttal of Cultural Zionism in “Palestine un di Yidn-Frage” 
claims that the so-called “spiritual center” had separated itself from the Diaspora “with a 
high wall of language and style.”78  The question of language in the Jewish state and in 
the Diaspora was one that Jews had asked and debated since the Haskalah.  On one side 
was Hebrew, the ancient language that Jews had inherited from their kingly history and 
their holy texts, but a language that until the advent of Zionism only male scholars of 
those texts actually learned.  On the other was Yiddish, the beloved mame loshen [mother 
tongue] of Jews on the street, but derided by maskilim (proponents of the Haskala) as a 
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mere “jargon” unworthy of the status of a real language.79  Although Zionists in Eastern 
Europe and in the United States had often used the Yiddish language in order to speak to 
the widest audience possible, Unzer Tsayt portrayed Zionists as people who had utter 
contempt for the language and the culture that it had spawned, which were exactly the 
“spiritual creation[s]” that were so “dear” to the Bund.80    
 To convey this image, “Palestine un di Yidn-Frage” compares Zionists to 
oppressors of Jews such as the autocratic rulers of Eastern Europe.  “Jewish masses,” it 
proclaims, “have conducted in the Diaspora a bitter struggle for the right of this mother 
tongue.”  It then cites a communication from Palestine calling for the closing of non-
Hebrew newspapers in Palestine, as they would “undermin[e] the mastery of Hebrew.”  
The article compares the ostracizing of Yiddish and any language not Hebrew to “ghetto 
restraints” on non-Hebrew speakers, and points out that unlike adopted policies 
concerning some national minority in the proto-state of Jewish Palestine, these measures 
target fellow Jews.81  Readers of the article are to be reminded of a Russian czar quashing 
the linguistic autonomy of Jews or other imperial minorities, and to be further outraged 
that the perpetrators now are Zionists targeting “their own brothers.”82  The use of the 
word “ghetto” during the Second World War would also have summoned thoughts of 
Nazi ghettoization.     
 The March 1943 article “Vegn di Gefangene bam Hebreizm” [“On the Captives 
of Hebraism”] intensifies the campaign for Yiddish by denouncing proponents of 
“bilingualism,” i.e., a “reconciliation” of the Yiddish and Hebrew language.  The article 
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compares the use of both languages in the task of advancing Jewish life to a man loving 
two brides.  Such a man will lose both brides, and both languages will decline if the 
Jewish people speak both.  The article also reaffirms the Bundist position that Yiddish 
must serve as the one Jewish language, reiterating that Diaspora Jews built a life and 
culture around the Yiddish language.  Furthermore, it concludes, Yiddish is the “strongest 
dam against assimilation,” and the Yishuv’s refusal to use Yiddish creates disunity within 
Jewry and fosters “unbelief” in the creative power of Yiddish.83 
 The very word “Diaspora”84 is, in the Weltanschauung of Zionists, a term for 
exile that calls to mind a longing to return to Israel and a deep sadness that the Jews have 
not yet returned there.  In several instances, writers in Unzer Tsayt put quotation marks 
around the word “Diaspora” to indicate their dismissal of this mindset.  One direct 
defense of the so-called Diaspora is an article from the very first issue of Unzer Tsayt 
called “Di Natsyonale Shlikhes fun Bund” [“The National Mission of the Bund”].  In this 
article, writer Abraham Menes identifies the Bund as the one party whose fate is 
“completely” tied with that of the Jews in the Diaspora because it rejected hope of a 
return to the Land of Israel and “remained a Diaspora party.”  Menes also reaffirms the 
Bund’s commitment to continue the struggle for Jewish life “in the countries where Jews 
live” in the future.85  Zionism’s commitment to emigration to Palestine is not only a 
“dangerous utopia[n]” vision,86 but an affront to an established and wonderful Jewish 
community that the Bund champions.   
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 One of the most sweeping attacks on Zionism leveled by the Representation is 
in“Der Eyker fun Tsiyonizm” [“The Principle of Zionism”], which Emanuel 
Nowogrodzki wrote in January 1944.  After an opening paragraph insulting the 
intelligence of one Shloyme Grodzenski,87 the article presents three hostile (and probably 
rhetorical) questions posed by Grodzenski to the Bund in the Labor Zionist Yiddish-
language newspaper Der Yidisher Kemfer [The Jewish Fighter], and then proceeds to 
answer each in turn.  The questions, in summarized form, are as follows: 
1. Why does the Representation not acknowledge the Socialist 
accomplishments in Palestine, while other Socialist groups (Jewish and 
non-Jewish) do? 
 
2. Why does the Bund not give a “rational answer” to the question of the 
Jews’ own land?  It cannot, because there is no reason why the Jews 
should not have one. 
 
3. Why does the Bund not dare to argue against the principle of Zionism: 
that a normal national life is only possible when the nation is concentrated 
in its own “territorial region?”88 
 
 In responding to the first question, Nowogrodzki contests the practicality of the 
Zionist enterprise.  After first proclaiming that the Representation is happy  “that the 
Jewish labor movement of Palestine is well organized” because “the success of labor in 
every other corner of the world would gladden [them],” he concludes that the success of 
labor in Palestine is tempered by Palestine’s “political and financial dependence on the 
general Zionist world organization.”  A visitor to Palestine would only see the result of 
charity on the part of supporters the world over, but the Bund, which was always among 
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the Jewish proletariat in Eastern Europe, witnessed firsthand what Nowogrodzki calls the 
“ruinous effect” Zionism had on working Jews in Łódź, Vilnius, and Białystok.  Zionism 
dismissed the “real and painful needs” of Jewish life in its demand for support for the 
Zionist idea, and future prosperity in Palestine will continue to tax the Diaspora.89        
 The second and third questions are more theoretical in nature, as are 
Nowogrodzki’s answers for them.  “Der Eyker fun Tsiyonizm” answers the second 
question that the Jewish people have lived the past two thousand years of its existence as 
a people without a territory, and for this reason the Bund believes that a Jewish national 
life need not be lived in a Jewish nation-state.  This solution to the Jewish Question--Jews 
living a “Jewish” life wherever they already are--will be the solution of the future 
Socialist society toward which mankind progresses.  By rejecting this Bundist (and 
Marxist) hope of inexorable progress toward a better future and seeking to solve the 
Jewish Question by “forcibly transforming the Jews into a territorial nation,” Zionism 
rejects the possibility of “national coexistence” within the borders of one state.90  The 
article begins its answer to Grodzenski’s third question by agreeing with him that a nation 
should live as a concentrated entity in a “territorial region,” disputing only that the region 
in question must be an independent state.  The article recycles its earlier arguments that 
Jews have already lived and created a culture outside of Palestine for two millennia, but 
raises the new objection that the “principle of Zionism” is a rejection of democracy, 
which is nothing other than people of different nations sharing the territory of a state as 
citizens of that state.  This, Nowogrodzki writes, implies that Zionists consider Jews in 
                                                
89 Emanuel Nowogrodski, “Der Eyker fun Tsiyonism,” Unzer Tsayt, January 1944,18-19. 
90 Ibid., 20. 
68  
Europe and America to be only “strangers” who are “visiting” those lands,91 a belief that 
Bundists trying to build a better Jewish life in the Diaspora would have rejected outright.  
Several times, the article offers the United States as a counterexample to Grodzenski’s 
claims, pointing out that Jews did not emigrate from Eastern Europe only to Palestine in 
the face of crisis, but journeyed in great numbers to America as well; and that citizens of 
the United States share in the wealth of the country regardless of their national origins.92   
 Several Unzer Tsayt articles contended that the creation of a Jewish state in 
Palestine would threaten the status of the Jews who remained in the Diaspora.  For, as 
“Der Eyker fun Bundizm” pointed out, Zionists could not possibly hope to bring all Jews, 
nor even the majority of Jews, to Palestine, and there would assuredly be Jews who 
remained in the Diaspora.93  The Jewish state would alter the status of these Jews as 
citizens of the countries wherein they resided.  According to “Di Poylishe Yidn un der 
‘Bund’” [“The Polish Jews and the ‘Bund’”], the Polish Bund feared that activism on 
behalf of Zionism would be “harmful for the Jewish population in Poland” because it 
would convey the message to Polish Gentiles that Jews did not consider themselves 
citizens of Poland,94 and the creation of the Jewish state would have cemented this 
conclusion in the collective minds of Diaspora countries.  Exclusion from Polish citizenry 
would have been an anathema to the Bund, which advocated Jewish cooperation with all 
fellow socialists in a state.  “Palestine un di Yidn-Frage” in particular envisioned a 
dystopian future in which Jews living outside the Jewish state would lose their status as 
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 The American Representation of the Bund attacked Zionism and Zionists in issues 
of Unzer Tsayt throughout the war because it opposed Zionist ideas and sought to prevent 
the Jews of New York City from donating any money to the Zionist enterprise.  
Prominent Zionist leaders viewed the Yishuv as a place of importance for saving 
European Jews from the Nazis, while the Representation claimed that Palestine was just 
one of many lands that would need to take in Jewish refugees, and that the most pressing 
goal for Americans, both Jews and Gentiles, ought to be aiding the Jews still in Europe.96  
However, the Representation’s crusade was not limited to print alone: it scored a tangible 
victory over the Zionists at a January 1942 meeting of the board of the Jewish Labor 
Committee (JLC).  At this meeting, Bundist leader Shloime Mendelsohn and his 
Representation colleagues argued that the JLC should remove the issue of Palestine from 
its agenda, “since the Jewish community there, half a million strong, was not very 
meaningful for the future of the world’s 16 million Jews.”97  The Bundists were 
successful: though the JLC continued to profess its concern for “the future of the Jewish 
people wherever Jews live,” its secretary-general Jacob Pat removed issue of a Jewish 
national home in Palestine from the group’s agenda.  In practical terms, this meant that 
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from 1942 onward, members of the Representation claimed a large share of the JLC’s 
relief funds and apportioned it as they saw fit.98      
 The Representation’s ideological opposition to Zionism centered on the 
fundamental failure of the Zionist agenda to solve the so-called “Jewish Question” and 
the intellectual strife it would cause the Jewish people.  Objections of this type included a 
repudiation of Hebrew’s supremacy over Yiddish and the belief that a Jewish State would 
doom prospects of harmony between Jews and non-Jews in the Diaspora.  The Diaspora 
itself is not a miserable exile, the Representation explained, but the home of most Jews 
and a home to be cherished.  The practical faults of Zionism that the Representation 
pointed out were rooted in matters such as the logistics of a large-scale aliyah and the 
feasibility of building a Jewish homeland once in Palestine.  Not all Jews could possibly 
relocate to Palestine, and the Jewish State would still have need of the Diaspora 
community.  By polemicizing against Zionists who, according to Unzer Tsayt, 
championed a Jewish State in Palestine that would quash Yiddish language and culture 
and lord over a Jewish community in the Diaspora reduced to resident aliens, the 
Representation again delineated a Bund that would cherish Yiddish and work on behalf 
of Jews alongside non-Jewish Socialists to create a global Marxist paradise where Jews 
would live in bliss. 
   Today the victory of Zionism over Bundism is apparent, despite the efforts of the 
Bund and the Representation in print, in politics, and within Jewish society in Europe and 
the United States.  The State of Israel was born in 1948, and each year it receives influxes 
of donations and immigration from around the world (though admittedly all Jews do not 
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live there).  The Bund’s hope of a global Socialist utopia never materialized, and the 
remnants of the Bund in Eastern Europe were disbanded by the Soviet Union by the end 
of the 1940s.99  Elsewhere, the Presidium of the Representation voted to disband itself in 
1945 and joined the newly formed International Jewish Labor Bund in 1947.  However, 
this new body never exercised much authority over Bundist groups in different countries, 
whose worldwide membership numbered only a few thousand at its highest in the 1950s 
and who one by one closed their doors.  Today, the Melbourne Bund chapter is the only 
one active.100  But in the early 1940s, this triumph of Zionism was by no means assured.  
Palestine remained under the control of a British government eager to cooperate with the 
Arab populace, and Zionism remained one ideology out of many among Jews.  The 
American Representation of the Bund in Poland could (and did) rightly claim that 
Zionism was a minority movement incapable of commanding the full support of 
American Jewry,101 and that the Bund’s vision for the future of the Jewish people was a 
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 In this thesis, I have argued that the American Representation of the Bund in 
Poland utilized its primary Yiddish-language newspaper, Unzer Tsayt [Our Time], to 
advance its aim of raising material and financial aid in New York City to send overseas to 
Bundists remaining in Nazi-occupied Poland.  Jewish Socialism in New York City 
originated with Russian immigrants who wished to continue the revolutionary struggle 
that they had begun in imperial Russia, but lacked the precedent and immediate need to 
do so in the United States.  In order to achieve relevance among the Jews of New York 
City, Jewish Socialists used the Yiddish language and engaged in community service 
projects such as education and financial aid.  Jewish Socialism in New York City was 
never united under one movement, but different parties shared this trait of assisting their 
constituency.  The success of Jewish Socialism in the United States inspired the creation 
of the Algemeyner Yidisher Arbeter Bund in Lite, Poyln, un Rusland [General Jewish 
Workers’ Union in Lithuania, Poland, and Russia], commonly known as the “Bund,” 
which sought to preserve Jewish communal interests and use the Yiddish language while 
simultaneously participating in international Marxism.  In times of crisis, particularly in 
the event of pogroms or war, the Bund could rely on monetary aid from brother 
movements in places such as New York City.   
 During and after World War I, the Bund split along new state lines.  The Polish 
Bund was the largest Jewish political party in the Second Polish Republic and financed 
youth activities and school systems.  When the Germans invaded Poland in September 
1939, many of the Bund’s key leaders fled the country and went to New York City, 
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where they established the American Representation of the Bund in Poland in 1941.  
Rapidly acclimating itself to a new country and a Jewish population with a markedly 
different outlook from the Jews of Eastern Europe, the Representation raised money 
throughout the war for the Bundists remaining in Poland and published several 
newspapers, including Unzer Tsayt.  In this newspaper, the Representation worked to 
convince readers that any donations on behalf of Jews in occupied Poland ought to go to 
the Representation and thence to the Bund.   
 The Representation presented the history of the Bund to readers of Unzer Tsayt in 
a manner that would convince them that the Bund had done the most to benefit the Jews 
in Eastern Europe and the United States.  In Eastern Europe, the writers of Unzer Tsayt 
claim, the Bund was the only group that successfully melded Marxist aims of progress 
toward a better world with the unique national and cultural interests of the Jews.  In the 
United States, they claim, the Bund was really the driving force behind the success of 
Jewish Socialism, since any Jewish Socialism is merely an incarnation of the Bund 
adapted to that country and time.   
 In Eastern Europe and in the United States, Bundists and Zionists had a long-
standing rivalry stemming from their completely incompatible aims.  Zionists desired a 
return of the Jews to the Land of Israel and the use of Hebrew, while Bundists wanted to 
improve the lot of Jews in the lands where they lived using Yiddish.  Zionism’s 
popularity had grown in the United States since the turn of the 20th century, and the 
Representation resisted its influence on the coffers of American Jews during World War 
II.  In Unzer Tsayt, they elucidated their belief that the Zionist agenda was incompatible 
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with Jewish life in the Diaspora and that Zionists cared nothing for the Diaspora or the 
Yiddish language, making them unworthy of Jewish support.   
 In this thesis, I sought to situate the newspaper Unzer Tsayt in the narrative of the 
Representation and its desperate attempt to support its comrades who remained under 
Nazi rule.  In order to have raised the money that it did, the Representation had to have 
communicated effectively with the Jewish public in New York City.  I sought to 
demonstrate the primacy of Unzer Tsayt in facilitating that engagement. 
 
Epilogue: “Only the Bund can free the slaves”1 
 In a conversation I had with Professor Zvi Gitelman of the University of 
Michigan regarding this thesis, I learned that he had met several former members of the 
American Representation of the Bund in Poland during his time as a graduate student at 
Columbia University.  World War II had long ended, and the State of Israel had already 
fought two wars to defend its existence.  Yet despite these world developments, Gitelman 
recalled, the Bundists continued to cling to the figures and ideologies of their past, unable 
to accept that that world was forever lost to them and that their future would never 
materialize.2  Seeking textual testimony to this mournful devotion, I learned of a three-
volume biography of Bundists called Doires Bundistn [Generations of Bundists], 
compiled and edited in 1968 by Jacob Sholem Hertz, a former member of the Bund’s 
Central Committee who wrote, published, or edited multiple histories of the Bund after 
World War II.3  The very act of assembling Doires Bundistn attests to the great value the 
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postwar Bund placed in its history, but the entry about Representation leader Emanuel 
Nowogrodzki captures the group’s fixation on the past particularly well. 
 During the war, writes fellow Representation member Emanuel Szerer, 
Nowogrodzki was willing to tailor the Bund to its new environment in New York City, 
but remained ardent in upholding the Bund’s original ideology.  Adaptation to America 
was never the goal of the Representation, but merely the means of achieving its goal: the 
dissemination of Bundist ideas in America.  Even after the war, after the Holocaust, and 
after the declaration of the State of Israel, Nowogrodzki was among those who 
maintained that “principles and ideas of consistent, classical Bundism” and its “founding 
words and founding goals” were still right, “in America as in other lands where Jews 
live[d].”  Nowogrodzki continued to work for the Bund in America after the war, 
overseeing the transfer of the Bund Archive to New York City, hosting the Bund’s 
weekly radio program beginning in 1954, and serving as the first secretary for the 
worldwide Bund, which had its founding conference in Brussels in 1947.  Nowogrodzki 
was partially paralyzed by a stroke in April 1961 and died six years later in an Arbeter 
Ring home for old members.  Even in this condition, writes Szerer, until his dying day, 
Nowogrodzki still kept informed of Bundist news and lost none of his devotion to the 
party.  Szerer concludes with these words: “The Bund was the most profound matter in 
his life.  Even until his last moment.”4 
 In my own opinion, the legacy of the Bund is an unhappy one.  In its early years 
in the Russian Empire and in its heyday in the Second Polish Republic, the Bund never 
fully realized its goals to be both the voice of Jewry within the international Socialist 
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movement (its “organizational principle”) and the fosterer of secular Yiddish culture (its 
doctrine of “national-cultural autonomy”).  In New York City, the Representation 
continued to advocate a party platform that the Bund had never achieved, constantly 
providing excuses for this failure and continuing to insist that the Bund’s program was 
still the right one for the future of the Jews.  The Holocaust took a horrific toll on the 
Bund’s membership and zeal, and since the end of World War II the Bund has declined to 
almost nonexistence.  Today, in my experience, the Yiddish language is almost entirely 
confined to the communities of academia and the Khasidim.  A worldwide Socialist 
utopia did not emerge, but the State of Israel did.  Perhaps the only solace that the 
Bundists of history would find in the modern world is that all Jews do not live in the State 
of Israel and most are content to live in the Diaspora.  Dokayt, in some form, is the norm 
among world Jewry. 
 But really, the continued loyalty of aging Bundists to Bundism after the war is not 
so incomprehensible.  In their youth, they had not sung idly when they swore “an endless 
loyalty to the Bund” and proclaimed “[o]nly it can free the slaves now.”  As wiser 
veterans and members of the American Representation of the Bund in Poland, they used 
Unzer Tsayt to communicate their fervent belief that the Bund would create a better 
world for Jews in all lands, and that no other party or ideology could do the same.  After 
decades of working on behalf of such a vision, they could not do otherwise but preserve 
it.  Explaining why she remained a committed member of the Bund in New York City 
after the war and into advanced age, one woman explained simply, “‘The Bund was an 
organization that took the poor and made them dreamers for justice.’”5    
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